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Introduction
and overview
1 Introduction and overview
1.1 Present systems of monitoring and protecting human rights
The post-1945 era saw a dynamic promotion of human rights and as a
consequence, human rights instruments were codified at a rate never
encountered before.1 The then newly established United Nations (UN)
— which was still trying to cope with the horrors of two world wars in
general and, in particular, with human rights atrocities committed by
Nazi Germany during the Second World War — declared the promotion
of human rights one of its main objectives: Article 1(3) of the UN
Charter of 1945 stipulates as one explicit purpose, common to all
member states, the achievement of ‘international co-operation [...]
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion’.2 The adoption of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration)3 by the General
Assembly reflects the resolve to protect human rights. This
instrument established the acknowledgment of human rights as an
inseparable principle of international law. Soon it became apparent,
however, that such declarations would not in themselves protect
human rights, and that human rights would remain a difficult issue to
enforce under international law. Consequently, a sophisticated UN
system of monitoring, promoting and eventually protecting human
rights developed under the various UN charter and treaty
1 See Cassese International law (2004) 350, Dugard International law — a South
African perspective (2005) 308-309.
2 Limiting its scope territorially, art 2(7) stipulates ‘within the domestic
jurisdiction’.
3 GA Res 217 A (III) Annex adopted on 10 December 1948.ix
x    Introduction and overviewinstruments.4 This ‘backbone’ of UN human rights protection is
supplemented by other regional human rights protection systems.
Human rights protection today begins with the acknowledgment
and subsequent codification of specific human rights and fundamental
freedoms by an individual signatory state at international and regional
level. The next necessary step is the safeguarding of these rights by
means of special organs monitoring compliance, for example, human
rights commissions which were established under the various regional
instruments assisted in their work by various non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). There are three main procedures of monitoring
compliance: the examination of periodic state reports on their actual
compliance, the review of inter-state complaints and, thirdly — the
most effective procedure — the individual complaint mechanism
which is an existing semi-judicial procedure of human rights
protection.5 Effectiveness of the third procedure can be measured by
the extent of individual communications before regional human rights
courts which establish actual judicial review mechanisms of human
rights protection. These human rights procedures increasingly create
state accountability for human rights violations and are matched by a
set of increasingly varied remedies. The shift from mere monitoring
and promoting human rights towards the creation of a system of
accountability of states and, to a lesser extent, of individuals6 for
human rights violations has consequently become a reality in
international law. 
International human rights law ultimately means, in the words of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), ‘the
international protection of human rights’ which 
should not be confused with criminal justice. [...] The objective of
international human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are
guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims and to provide for
the reparation of damages resulting from the acts of the States
responsible.7
State accountability imposes on the individual state the duty to
protect human rights and enforce these domestically and, to a limited
extent, internationally. It materialises as various political, legal,
4 The legal development of human rights protection in the UN followed essentially
three doctrinal influences: the western doctrine from 1945 to the mid-50s, the
socialist doctrine from the mid-50s to the mid-70s and thirdly, from the mid-70s
until today, the doctrine of developing countries, see Cassese (n 1) 354-356.  
5 Cassese (n 1) 363. 
6 An example of quite an effective system for individual accountability is US human
rights litigation under the Alien Torts Claims Act and related acts. See part B for a
discussion of US human rights litigation. 
7 See the Velasquez Rodriguez decision of 1988 Ser C No 4 reported in (1988) 9
Human Rights Law Journal 212 par 134.
  Introduction and overview    xiadministrative and, to a lesser extent, financial sanctions imposed on
an offending state. 
1.2 A brief evaluation of the present systems of monitoring and 
protecting human rights
Systems for protecting human rights based on the Charter and treaties
suffer from a general absence of strong inter- and intra-state
accountability mechanisms. The existing human rights protection
regimes are ‘weak’ in terms of available sanctions and remedies
against a violating state and even weaker in respect to the eventual
enforcement of such sanctions.8 The weakness of the existing human
rights systems seems to haunt UN Charter and treaty-based
procedures in particular.9 One plausible reason for this shortcoming is
that existing human rights protection regimes mainly address states
as the bearers of human rights obligations and not an individual or
corporate violator.10 
The overall objective of establishing a workable regime for the
global protection of human rights based on the existing systems of
human rights protection, as established by the UN with its seven
treaty systems and supplemented by the three regional systems of
Europe, the Americas and Africa, has possibly not been achieved. The
universal recognition and promotion of human rights has, however,
become indisputably a key element and focus of today’s international
policy. Consequently, the notion of state responsibility for human
rights violations has been developed, leading to an intra- and inter-
state awareness of the existence of human rights and the need to
protect them. 
Existing forms of state accountability have failed to put an end to
human rights violations, as the international community witnesses
daily. The main reasons for this failure are, firstly, that compliance
with human rights obligations still largely fall within the discretion of
respective states with the direct consequence that only states with a
highly-developed human rights law culture comply with obligations;
secondly, the lack of supplementary human rights provisions, which
establish individual and non-state actor responsibility, exempts the
8 With the overall problem of leaving the implementing of human rights often
solely to the discretion of the individual signatory states.
9 As highlighted by UN Secretary-General’s recent criticism of the work of the UN
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), see ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s
high level panel on threats, challenges and change’ UN Doc A/59/565 of 2
December 2004 par 283 and the subsequent UN Secretary General’s report ‘In
larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’ UN Doc
A/59/2005 of 21 March 2005 par 182.
10 Corporate accountability for human rights atrocities has become an established
feature of US civil litigation. See 2.4.4 below for a detailed account of corporate
liability under US law.
xii    Introduction and overviewactual perpetrators of human rights violations from accountability;11
and, thirdly, the lack of a universal forum for addressing violations
such as a Universal Human Rights Court as body supplementary to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) or as a new independent judicial
organ.
General awareness of the need to protect human rights, as
documented in the various international and regional human rights
instruments, will hopefully lead to improved human rights conditions.
The constantly developing human rights protection regimes with their
specific legal instruments provide the world with impressive
guidelines and court authority for use in an additional and
supplementing regime of individual civil accountability.
Generally, conventions, having the nature of international
treaties, leave the future implementation of human rights solely
within the discretion of the individual signatory states. ‘Opting out’
and ‘claw-back’ clauses and legal possibilities for states to eventually
suspend their membership or even withdraw totally from human
rights treaties without any mandatory sanctions12 are further reasons
for non-compliance with existing human rights regimes. 
The predominantly weak enforcement mechanisms of existing
human rights regimes further reduce their already limited
effectiveness.13 An individual victim seeking redress for violations of
his or her human rights, or an organisation or NGO acting on his or her
behalf, is dependent on the existence of an effective system. The lack
of an effective system will ultimately deter not the human rights
offender, but those seeking protection from gross human rights
abuses. Consequently, the establishment of an international judicial
organ for human rights protection in the form of a permanent
‘Universal Human Rights Court’, in addition to or integrated with the
ICJ, which is equipped with universal human rights jurisdiction and
explicit means of enforcement would improve the protection of
human rights considerably. 
In conclusion one can state that there are serious shortcomings
and weaknesses in existing international and regional human rights
monitoring and protection mechanisms. These mechanisms create
only the opportunity to publicise human rights atrocities, organise
11 Nowak Introduction to the international human rights regime (2003) 289.
12 See, for example, the withdrawal of its member states Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago from the American Convention in the 2002 document.
13 See the Shaka Sankofa case before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights Case 11 193 of 11 August 1993, as a drastic example of non-compliance of a
member state with a human rights organ’s request. The petitioner was executed
by the US while his complaint was pending before the Commission and after the
US was formally requested to suspend the execution, Inter- American Commission
on Human Rights Press Release No 9/00 28 June 2000.
  Introduction and overview    xiiisupport for the victims and their relatives and apply pressure on
states and individuals through documenting and denouncing
atrocities.14 Safeguarding actual human rights protection, preventing
human rights violations and, ultimately, deterring future human rights
abuses are at present beyond the actual capabilities of existing human
rights regimes.15 The Rwandan mass violations case16 before the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
exemplifies this inherent weakness of current human rights protection
regimes. Even the documentation of serious human rights violations
before an international forum did not prevent the subsequent
genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
1.3 Criminal accountability for human rights atrocities
Existing human rights protection regimes have one severe defect in
common: They engage only individual member states and not the
individual as the bearer of human rights obligations. Lacking such
recognition, the atrocities of an individual human rights violator do
not fall under the provisions of the ‘inter-state’ human rights regimes.
The failure to establish accountability and responsibility of the
individual or corporate17 perpetrator under the main existing human
rights treaties is an important reason for the limited success of
regimes.
The traditional perception of human rights — active or passive
rights of individuals in relation to their home states,18 lacking
necessary sanction mechanisms for non-compliance — does not
address the reality where, first of all, human rights atrocities are
committed by individuals19 and not by abstract entities such as states.
This perception does not reflect the famous opening address of the US
Chief Prosecutor Jackson before the International Military Tribunal
14 Especially the latter is becoming increasingly important with regard to
subsequent criminal and civil accountability.
15 See Lattimer ‘Enforcing human rights through international criminal law’ in
Lattimer & Sands Justice for crimes against humanity (2003) 387 et seq, who
identifies ‘a crisis in the international system of human rights protection’.
16 See the (joined) communication no 27/89, 46/91, 49/91 and 99/93 before the
ACHPR, retrievable at http//www.achpr.org. 
17 Since the end of the Cold War, multinational corporations (MNCs) have become
prominent perpetrators of human rights violations. See part A ch 2 for a detailed
account on corporate human rights violations with their civil adjudication before
US federal courts.
18 See, eg, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) which
contains in arts 6-27 classical first generation human rights as rights which bind
the individual state party to comply with and restrain from certain violations. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) depicts
social and economic rights as second generation human rights. 
19 Acting either as an organ or agent of a state and/or in their individual capacity.
The 2003 atrocities, committed in Liberia and Burundi by so-called, self-
appointed war lords reflect the present reality where non-state actors are
increasingly the main perpetrators. 
xiv    Introduction and overviewfor the Trial of the Major War Criminals (IMT) in Nuremberg: ‘Crimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of international law be enforced’.20 Only the
establishment of a separate accountability system for the individual
human rights violator could deter them. Such an accountability
system, however, cannot derive directly from the existing human
rights protection regimes because existing instruments only establish
and govern the relations between signatory states.
Existing human rights instruments establish state responsibility21
to a certain extent, for human rights violations, which are
attributable to state organs. Additional ways of establishing a working
regime for individual criminal or civil responsibility22 for these
violations obviously fall outside the scope of these instruments. At
present, and considering the nature of the existing instruments, they
can only serve as general guidelines and provisions for a future corpus
of individual criminal law.
1.4 Brief evaluation of criminal prosecution of human rights 
atrocities
The present practice of establishing individual criminal responsibility
for core crimes and subsequent prosecution in international and
domestic forums have developed rapidly into an emerging system of
international criminal justice.
The balance sheet of prosecuting international crimes looks quite
impressive at first glance: The last decade has seen the establishment
of three ad hoc tribunals,23 one permanent criminal court,24 the de-
20 IMT, judgment of 1 October 1946 in 22 IMT Trials 466 reprinted in (1947) 41
American Journal of International Law 172-221.
21 With the possibility of state civil liability in a more or less developed state. See
part A ch 1 below for an evaluation and discussion of the question of state civil
responsibility.
22 By requiring state parties to create workable means of criminal accountability for
the individual perpetrator by imposing eg the prime obligation to either
prosecute or extradite, the aut dedere aut judicare of international criminal law;
see eg arts 6-7 of the Genocide Convention.
23 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established
under SC Res 827 UN Doc S/Res/827 (1993) with its Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia of 25 May 1993 (ICTY Statute) the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) established under SC Res 955 UN Doc S/Res/955 (1994) with its
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by the same SC Res and
reprinted in (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 1598, 1600 and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), established as a mixed legal court in 2002 in
pursuant to SC Res 1315 UN Doc S/Res/1315 (2000).
24 The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague with its statute, the Statute
of the International Court of 17 July 1998 (ICC Statute).
  Introduction and overview    xvtermination to prosecute high-ranking officials for core crimes25 and
the development of various domestic penal codes asserting universal
jurisdiction.26 The development of international justice, however,
must be seen as a direct consequence of a ‘crisis in the international
system of human rights protection’27 which in effect denounces 40
years of human rights protection as weak, underdeveloped and, in
some cases, even futile.
The second method of human rights protection — by means of
criminal prosecution — is still developing and only a partial solution.
The following shortcomings and obstacles can be summarised: The
doctrine of functional immunity for serving heads of state and other
state officials limits the exercise of the principle of universal criminal
jurisdiction;28 the chronic lack of resources necessary for effective
prosecution; problematic and sometimes non-existent judicial co-
operation in criminal matters; the oftenly apparent reluctance of
individual states to assist in the prosecution of perpetrators of
international crimes (as highlighted by the difficulties encountered by
the two ad hoc tribunals); the inherent question whether they
resemble forums of selective justice and the limitation of the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) ratione materiae to effectively
process crimes and the supplementary nature of its jurisdiction.
25 Examples hereof are the Pinochet case, R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) (HL) (E) [2000] 1 AC 147, the
conviction for genocide of the former Rwandan prime minister Jean Kambanda in
1998, ICTR-97-23-T and the indictment before the ICTY of (now deceased) Serb
president Slobodan Milosevic (IT-02-54).
26 Lattimer & Sands (n 15 above) 12.
27 As above 387 with additional references.
28 See the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant Of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Belgium) ICJ (14 February 2002) (2002) International
Court of Justice Reports retrievable at http://icj-cij.org for an example of how
the international community limited the scope of prosecuting jus cogens crimes.
On 11 April 2000, a Belgian investigating judge issued and afterwards circulated
an international arrest warrant against the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, (DRC), Yerodia Ndombasi. The charges of
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, of the Additional Protocols
thereto and crimes against humanity were punishable in Belgium under its
‘Genocide’ Law of 1993 as amended in 1999. Yerodia was indicted for his hate
speeches, aimed at inciting violence against Tutsi residents in Kinshasa, DRC. On
17 October 2000 the DRC issued the ICJ with an application instituting
proceedings against Belgium in respect of the inter-state dispute arising from the
issuing of the arrest warrant. The DRC claimed that Belgium had violated the
‘principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another
State’, the ‘principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United
Nations’ […] as well as ‘the diplomatic immunity of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
[…]’. In essence, the court’s judgment of 14 February 2002 found that the DRC’s
application was admissible, the issuing of the arrest warrant ‘constituted
violations of a legal obligation’ of Belgium towards the DRC under international
law and that ‘Belgium failed to respect the (full) immunity from criminal
jurisdiction’ that Yerodia enjoyed as an incumbent Foreign Minister, as above para
78(1) and (2).
xvi    Introduction and overviewCertain obstacles still stand in the way of effective protection of
human rights by means of criminal prosecution: the supplementary
and limited jurisdiction of the ICC; the ad hoc tribunals’ current
difficulties in prosecuting effectively because of a case overload; the
lack of sufficient resources; the absence of the political will to comply
with requests of judicial co-operation and enforcement, et cetera.
With the DRC v Belgium decision of the ICJ, the evolving attempts to
prosecute international crimes before domestic criminal courts have
been severely impaired for the sake of upholding an outdated
principle of state sovereignty. As a consequence, the perception that
‘states have only established or engaged domestic or international
fora to hold persons accountable sporadically and often with
reluctance’29 continues to hold its worth.
These shortcomings demand alternative, supplementing measures
against the perpetrators of international human rights violations.
Examples can be found in the US and Canadian practice30 of
denaturalisation and deportation as additional means of establishing
accountability. This practice, which is well used in the Anglo-
American sphere, is nearly unknown to continental European criminal
law practice. Its value is limited to cases where the deportee
perceives such measures as ‘punishment’. It is doubtful to what
extent this creates a general deterrence.
Given these obstacles and shortcomings, it seems unlikely that the
goal of establishing a more comprehensive system of international
criminal justice will be achieved soon. Other supplementary and
additional ways of human rights protection as alternatives to criminal
prosecution, should be utilised and, if necessary, developed further.
One additional means worth considering is the concept of human
rights litigation as developed over the last three decades in the US.
The next part of this study explains the development of the concept
of civil liability for international human rights atrocities, the
realisation of this principle through human rights litigation and its
impact on the protection of human rights.
The difficulties as discussed hinder the creation of a universal
system of individual criminal accountability with the result that
necessary deterrence does not exist. In addition to criminal
accountability, the supplementary or isolated use of alternative
accountability means, such as the establishment of investigatory and
reconciliation commissions and/or the use of immigration measures,
for example, repatriation, are equally questionable from a
deterrence point of view.
29 Ratner & Abrams Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law:
beyond the Nuremberg legacy (2001) 331.
30 See eg the US Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
Pub L 104-208 Div C 110 Stat 3009-546 and the Canadian Citizenship Act.
  Introduction and overview    xviiThe establishment — in addition to existing ways of protecting
human rights — of an international regime of strict individual civil
liability for the commission of both international core crimes and
other gross human rights violations, termed ‘human rights
atrocities’31 might well prove to be a solution to existing
shortcomings.
Part A discusses the present situation on civil liability and
responsibility under international and domestic law, respectively.
Part B introduces a draft Statute for a Convention on Individual Civil
Liability for Human Rights Atrocities as a supplement to existing
human rights protection measures.
31 The term ‘human rights atrocities’ refers to serious international crimes and
human rights violations such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
the crime of aggression, torture and (state-sponsored) terrorism. These crimes
are also referred to as so-called core crimes, see eg Murphy ‘Civil liability for the
commission of international crimes as an alternative to criminal prosecution’
(1999) 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 6. These acts constitute jus cogens
violations, imposing on international states an erga omnes duty of aut dedere aut
judicare. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v
Spain) ICJ (1970) ICJ Reports 3 as an exemplary judicial example on state
responsibility for jus cogens violations.

Part A
Civil accountability for gross human rights
violations under international
and domestic law
Introduction and overview 
The following section32 introduces and outlines concepts and
mechanisms of civil liability for human rights atrocities that are
presently available in international and domestic law. The different
approaches are evaluated within their historical and country-specific
contexts. This part concludes with the notion that the establishment
of an international regime of individual civil liability for gross human
rights violations is an essential feature of future protection of human
rights on a global scale.
32 Certain themes in this section were discussed in Bachmann ‘Liability for gross
human rights violations: from criminal to civil remedies’ unpublished LLD thesis,
University of Johannesburg, 2006 and in two further articles, SDOV Bachmann
‘Where do we stand with human rights litigation against corporations?’ (2007) 2
Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 292-309 and Strydom & Bachmann ‘Civil liability
for gross human rights violations’ (2005) 3 Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 448-
469. 1
Chapter 1
Civil responsibility of states for human rights 
atrocities under international law
 
1 The concept of state responsibility
The starting point of this discussion relates to mapping and
understanding the historic legal roots of states’ civil accountability33
as a precursor to individual civil liability. Following the century-old
concept of states and not individuals being the bearers of rights and
obligations under international law, state responsibility resembles
primarily a system of state liability for inter-state wrongs. 
Historically, the practice of holding states civilly accountable for
their acts towards other states was developed in the context of war
with the inherent motive of compensating the winning side for its war
efforts and to punish, vae victis, the defeated. At so-called peace
conferences the victors dictated their conditions. In exchange for
peace, the defeated were to pay hefty financial compensation and
relinquish territory. An example is the (second) Peace Conference of
Versailles of 1919, where Germany became subject to financial and
territorial reparations unknown in Europe since the Middle Ages.34 
A further development of the concept of state accountability saw
the evolution of an independent principle of international law on
state civil responsibility.35 The Permanent Court of International
33 The terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’ are used as interchangeable terms
in this chapter.
34 Over 40 per cent of the Reich’s original territory, in addition to all German
colonies of that time, were ceded to the victors to punish the German people for
war guilt which had been determined solely by the victorious powers. This is
arguably one factor that led to the subsequent rise of the Nazi movement in
Germany. 
35 See Shaw International law (2003) 696, for requirements of establishing state
responsibility: intrastate legal obligation, its violation through an action or
omission imputable to the state responsible and lastly, loss or damage as a direct
consequence thereof. 2
  Chapter 1    3Justice (PCIJ) established with its Chorzow Factory,36 decision the
principle that states are civilly liable for attributable acts of
international wrongs and responsible for financial reparations.37 
The ICJ has followed this principle on state responsibility in its
jurisprudence since its establishment in 1945.38 A fairly recent
example is the Nicaragua v United States of America case,39 which
confirmed the ICJ’s determination40 to hold states accountable for
international wrongs.41 
The International Law Commission (ILC) acknowledged these dicta
in its ‘Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally
wrongful acts’.42 Article 1 stipulates that ‘every internationally
wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that
state’43 and consequently obliges it to make restitution.44 Today,
such state liability can arise from any inter-state action or omission
36 Chorzow Factory (Ger v Pol) Jurisdiction (1927) 9 Permanent Court of
International Justice Reports 21: on the nature of reparations, Chorzow Factory
(Ger v Pol) Indemnity (1928) 17 Permanent Court of International Justice Reports
(Ser A) 29. The case concerned an incident where Poland had unlawfully seized
German property in the disputed region of Upper Silesia and thus breached the
German-Polish Convention Concerning Upper Silesia of 15 May 1922.
37 Indemnity (1928) 17 Permanent Court of International Justice Reports (Ser A) 47
where the Court found that ‘The essential principle contained in the actual
notion of an illegal act […] is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all
the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in
all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in
kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value
which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place
of it – such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.’
38 See eg the Corfu Channel case (UK v Albania) (1949) ICJ Reports 244; Aerial
Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America)
(2996) ICJ Reports 9 et seq. 
39 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v United States of America); there the ICJ found that the US under the
Reagan administration was responsible for interfering in Nicaragua’s internal
affairs by its active support of the insurgency of Contra rebels against the lawful
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s, see (1986) ICJ Reports 14. 
40 The US withdrew from the proceedings after the ICJ had ruled that it had
jurisdiction over the case despite the US’ objections hereto. The US under the
Reagan administration revoked its acceptance of the optional clause to the ICJ of
1946.
41 In its 2004 decision Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the
occupied Palestinian territory, the ICJ found that the construction of Israel’s
‘defensive’ wall in the occupied Palestinian territory was contrary to
international law and created the obligation for Israel to make reparation for all
damages caused. Summary No 2004/2 retrievable at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/decisions/Summary. 
42 ‘Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts’ of 2001
in Official records of the General Assembly 55th session Supplement No 10 (A/
56/10) Ch IV E1.
43 Art 2 defines the further requirements of such liability. See also art 3 of the
earlier ‘Draft articles on state responsibility’ of 1975 UN Doc A/CN 4/SER A/1975/
Add 1 by the International Law Commission (ILC). 
44 ‘Draft articles’ (n 42 above) art 35.
4    Part A(that is, failure to protect other states from the occurrence of such
acts that are attributable to the state in question and not justifiable
to the point that wrongfulness is overlooked.45 Examples of such
internationally wrongful acts,46 as found in international juris-
prudence and treaty law, are shooting down aircraft, sinking or
damaging ships, attacking diplomatic missions and its personnel and
trans-state pollution.47
Besides the ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, suitable forums for adjudicating these state liability claims are
international arbitration tribunals and ad hoc claims tribunals and
commissions,48 with the latter often established through bi-national
peace treaties.
In 1991 Iraq was reminded of the state liability principle by the UN
Security Council in its Resolution 687, whereby Iraq was held
accountable ‘under international law’ for ‘any direct loss, damage,
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and cor-
porations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait’.49 Another example of addressing state accountability in this
form is the UN General Assembly’s ‘Resolution on a definition of
aggression’ of 1974,50 which established state responsibility for an act
of aggression.51 
2 State responsibility for human rights violations
State civil responsibility for acts constituting violations of basic
human rights is not a new concept in international law. For instance,
45 As above arts 20-27 list circumstances which preclude the wrongfulness of the
state’s action.
46 Civil liability for unlawful state action requires in addition to the existence of a
wrongful act a necessary sufficient causal link between the action and damage.
47 The ILC provides in its commentary to its ‘draft articles’ (n 42 above) an overview
of the various categories of wrongful acts and their subsequent adjudication. See
‘Commentaries to the draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally
wrongful acts’ 248-263.
48 See eg the UN Compensation Commission for Iraq, established under UN SC
Resolution 692 (1991) UN Doc S/22559 of 2 May 1991; the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, see Shaw (n 35 above) 247 and the most recent Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission (EECC) which was established pursuant art 5 of the bi-national
‘Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea’ of 12 December 2000;
reprinted in (2004) 43 International Legal Materials 1249.
49 UN SC Res 687 (1991) par 16.
50 UN GA Res 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.
51 Para 2 of art 5 of the Resolution reads ‘[a]ggression gives rise to international
responsibility’.
  Chapter 1    5a general principle of state liability for ‘grave breaches’52 of
humanitarian law by its forces during times of armed conflict can be
found in provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.53 This
concept of state liability was already developed under the ‘Law of
Hague’ where article 3 of Hague Convention IV54 of 1907 recognises a
general obligation on the perpetrator state to pay compensation for
breaching the Convention.55 Following the IMT’s recognition of the
‘Law of Hague’ as resembling customary law in 1939,56 the principle
that states are financially liable towards individual victims for war-
time human rights atrocities emerged as a concept in international
law. Furthermore the general notion57 currently exists that states
could be held liable for human rights atrocities in cases where such
acts resemble jus cogens violations58 of an erga omnes nature. The
final version of the ILC’s ‘Draft articles on responsibility of states for
internationally wrongful acts’59 (2001) reaffirms this form of state
liability in principle in articles 40 and 41.60 
One example of the acknowledgement of the protection of human
rights as a state obligation under international law is the above-
mentioned UN Security Council Resolution 687 where Iraq was found
responsible for the commission of ‘inhumane acts’ during its unlawful
occupation of the territory of Kuwait in 1990.61 Consequently, the UN
Compensation Commission (UNCC) compensated the victims of human
rights and humanitarian law violations, committed by Iraqi military
52 As defined in art 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, IV. Reference is
made to the grave breaches provisions of arts 50 GC I, 51 GC II, 130 GC III and 147
GC IV.
53 See art 51 of GC I, art 52 of GC II, art 131 of GC III and art 148 GC IV.
54 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
reprinted in 2 American Journal of International Law. Supp 90 and entered into
force on 26 January 1910, retrievable at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
peace/docs/con4.html.
55 As above. Art 3 reads: ‘A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the
said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed
forces.’
56 The IMT regarded violations of existing laws and customs of war according to the
Hague Rules on Land Warfare of 1899 and 1907 as violations of customary
international law.
57 See Shaw (n 35 above) 116 with judicial authorities mentioned.
58 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain)
(1970) ICJ Reports 3 as an exemplary judicial example on state responsibility for
jus cogens violations.
59 Note 42 above.
60 The duty to provide reparations for jus cogens violations derives from the
particular consequences of serious breaches of international obligations as
defined in chapter III, art 40 to para 3 of art 41, establishing state responsibility
for violations of peremptory norms with the duty to make reparations under arts
34-39 as a consequence. See ‘Commentaries to the draft articles on responsibility
of states for internationally wrongful acts’ (n 47 above) 283-284 and 291.
61 See UN SC Res 687 (1991) par 16 (n 49 above).
6    Part Aand security forces during the occupation of Kuwait, as so-called
individual claims.62 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugo,63 the ICJ, as the main judicial
forum of the UN, was faced for the first time with the question of
state liability for gross human rights violations.64 It found that
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was obliged to pay Bosnia and
Hercegovina, a sum to be determined by the Court, in its own right
and as parens patriae for its citizens, reparations for damages caused
to persons by violations of international law.65 At regional level, the
IACtHR established the dictum in the well-known Velasquez Rodriguez
v Honduras case,66 that states are explicitly obliged to protect human
rights not only under regional (human rights) treaty law but also under
customary international law.67
3 The individual as claims holder in cases of state 
responsibility for human rights violations
The legal concept of the individual as victim and claims holder in
persona is at present developing in terms of some of the existing
international and regional human rights instruments. As a concept or
even principle of general international law it remains the exception
and, as such, lacks universal recognition: International law still
follows the principle of the classical law of aliens where the
individual as such provides only the casu for subsequent inter-state
responsibility but does not hold a right on his or her own.68 The
individual’s state will then act on his or her behalf through means of
62 See para 12 of art 1 of the Commission’s ‘Provisional rules for claims procedure’
UN Doc S/AC 26/1992/10. 
63 (1993) ICJ Reports 3. 
64 In that case the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide was applied for the first time before the ICJ as a legal ground for
establishing state liability for acts of genocide.  
65 See judgment of the ICJ in the Case concerning application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v
Yugoslavia) paras 13(r) and 14(7) of the judgment. The judgment is retrievable at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyjudgment/
ibhy_ijudgment_19960711_frame.htm.
66 ‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights: judgment in Velasquez Rodriguez case’
(1989) 28 International Legal Materials 291.
67 As above paras 164-165.
68 Article 3 of the above-mentioned fourth Hague Convention of 1907 is sometimes
seen as conferring a direct right to financial compensation to the individual
victim. See Tomuschat Human rights – between idealism and realism (2003) 295
with reference to Karlshoven who supports this opinion in his article ‘State
responsibility for warlike acts of the armed forces’ (1991) 40 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 827 830-832. 
  Chapter 1    7diplomatic protection.69 The evolving idea that the individual victim
of human rights atrocities should have an individual and enforceable
right to financial redress with the necessary jus standi constitutes a
novum under international law.
3.1 Situation under international law
The notion that the individual (victim) is entitled to hold enforceable
rights on his or her own has developed in terms of emerging human
rights treaty regimes: Article 8 of the Universal Declaration70 grants
‘everyone the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by
the constitution or by law’.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (ICCPR)
Human Rights Committee applies article 2(3) of the ICCPR — ‘any
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated
shall have an effective remedy’ — for granting financial reparation to
victims of human rights violations.71 What remains uncertain,
however, is whether this right constitutes only a procedural right or
the right to an effective financial remedy as well.72 
In line with the wording of article 9(5) of the ICCPR, which
specifically stipulates that ‘anyone who has been the victim of
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to
compensation’, the nature of the remedy could be financial.
Tomuschat,73 on the contrary, uses the fact that compensation for
acts of miscarriage of justice under article 14(6) takes place in the
domestic context of the violating state to motivate that the term
‘effective remedy’ in article 2(3) is of a procedural nature only. The
HRC reads article 2(3) as a right to financial remedy74 for the victim
of state infringements of the ICCPR75 and bases its view mainly on
69 See the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case on state responsibility for
international wrongs and the enforcement of these claims through diplomatic
protection. Greece v UK 2 (1924) Permanent Court of International Justice
Reports (Series A) 12.
70 G A Res 217 A UN Doc A/RES/271 A (III) (1948).
71 Ann Maria Garcia Lanza de Netto v Uruguay Communication No 8/1977 UN Doc
CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) 45 decided on 3 April 1980, also known as the Weissmann
communication.
72 Tomuschat (n 68 above) 298 characterises redress as being solely procedural in
nature. He refers to the French and Spanish versions of the text, which, by using
the terms ‘recours’ and ‘recurso’, imply that only a procedural remedy was
intended by the ICCPR.
73 n 68 above.
74 Tomuschat ‘Reparations for victims of grave human rights violations’ (2001) 10
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 157, 167. 
75 Tomuschat (n 68 above) 298-299 commenting on the HRC’s findings on financial
remedies in the last 25 years.
8    Part Acustomary international law governing the consequences of
internationally wrongful acts and the duty to pay compensation.76
This view is supported by other legal opinion, which reasons that the
rationale behind article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR requires that a
substantive claim indeed arises as a mandatory consequence of the
violation.77 
Article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UN Torture
Convention),78 stipulates that the individual victim of acts of torture,
or his or her dependants in the case of death, shall, besides domestic
remedies, have a direct right to financial compensation for
suffering.79 This important, additional remedy for victims of torture
is yet to be harnessed by the Committee Against Torture (CAT). The
UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power,80 acknowledges the general principle of financial
compensation for victims of particular ‘state crimes’ such as unlawful
detention and acts of police brutality. 
The UN General Assembly widened this limited scope of
compensable human rights violations in 1998 by including the
violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms as redressable.
The Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms81 stipulates that ‘in the
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms […] everyone has
the right […] to benefit from an effective remedy […] including any
compensation due […]’.82 These declarations document the UN’s
growing determination to find an international principle on, and
formula for, state responsibility for human rights violations with
financial redress as further consequence.
Examples of this determination can be seen in the recent efforts
by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to develop and
implement ‘Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy
76 As above, 299.
77 See Klein ‘Individual reparation claims under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: the practice of the Human Rights Committee’ in
Randelzhofer & Tomuschat (eds) State responsibility and the individual —
reparation in instances of grave violations of human rights (1999) 32-34; Klein
argues further that in theory art 2(3) could be used to develop a financial claim
against the individual perpetrator as part of his or her own state’s general
liability. 
78 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General
Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984.
79 Art 14(1) of the Torture Convention provides that ‘[e]ach state party shall ensure
in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation’.
80 GA Res 40/43 of 29 November 1985.
81 GA Res 53/144 of 8 March 1999.
82 As above, art 9(1). 
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and humanitarian law’.83 These principles and guidelines result from
a drafting process which lasted more than a decade. Of particular
relevance is the study concerning the right to restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms of 1993,84 which was
undertaken by the UNCHR’s Special Rapporteur, Professor Van Boven
from the Netherlands. The findings of the study were used for two
subsequent drafts – those of 1996 and 1997 – of later codifications.85
In 1998 Professor M Cherif Bassiouni was appointed by the UNCHR as
the next Special Rapporteur to carry out the task of finalising the
draft codification.86 A finalised draft entitled ‘Basic principles and
guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law’ was adopted by the UNCHR on 20
April 200587 and recommended for later adoption by ECOSOC and the
General Assembly. This draft, which was eventually adopted on 16
December 2005 by the UN General Assembly,88 contains key elements
relating to the victim’s rights to reparation which shall be ‘adequate,
effective and prompt’ and ‘proportional to the gravity of the
violations and the harm suffered’.89 
3.2 Situation under regional treaty law
On the regional human rights level, the position of the individual
victim and claim-holder appears to be promising: All three
abovementioned regional human rights systems90 provide financial
compensation in theory at least. Article 13 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention)91 (Protocol 11) grants the right to an
effective remedy to ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in this Convention are violated’ and authorises in article 41 the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to grant partial financial
compensation in cases where domestic legislation of the affected
member state allows for it. 
In addition to the European Convention system, treaty law of the
European Community (EC) could provide for individual remedies for
83 E/CN 4/2000/62 of 18 January 2000.
84 E/CN 4/Sub 2/1193/8 of 2 July sec IX 1993.
85 E/CN 4/1996/17 of 24 May 1996 and E/CN 4/1997/104 of 16 January 1997.
86 E/CN 4/RES/1998/43.
87 E/CN 4/RES/2005/35.
88 A/RES/60/147.
89 As above Ch IX par 15 of the adopted basic principles.
90 See above Introduction and Overview.
91 Protocol No 11 to the European Convention (1994) 33 International Legal
Materials 960, 963.
10    Part Aviolations of EC law: The new Charter of Fundamental Rights92
protects basic human and fundamental rights related to dignity,
liberty, equality, solidarity, citizenship and justice. Awaiting later
incorporation into the EC Treaty, human rights protection still takes
place under the existing EC Treaty with the Court of Justice of the EC
as principal judicial organ. The Court has already granted financial
remedies to individual citizens of the EC against individual member
states for actions and omissions as well as failures to comply with EC
standards and93 their timely implementation in domestic law.94 
Recourse to financial compensation as redress for the violation of
human rights is available under the Inter-American human rights
regime, where article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights of 1969 (the American Convention) authorises the IACtHR to
rule that ‘fair compensation shall be paid to the injured party’.95 The
authorisation to grant financial remedies is a further development of
the original ‘right to judicial protection’ as set out under article 25 of
the ACHR. The IACtHR explicitly regards as one of the objectives of
international (human rights) law ‘not to punish those individuals who
are guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims and to
provide for the reparation of damages resulting from the acts of the
states responsible’.96
The African human rights system seems to acknowledge, in
principle, the possibility of redressing human rights atrocities in
article 27(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, whereby ‘the Court shall make appropriate
orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair
compensation or reparation’.97 
92 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 O J (C 364) 1, coming
into force on 7 December 2000.
93 See the case Van Gend & Loos where the Court found that EC and its member
states were obliged to respect the law determining individual EC citizens’ legal
position, N V Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos/
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue
Administration) Case 26/62 reprinted in (1963) European Court Reports 1.
94 In Francovich Germany was held liable for its omission to timely implement an EC
directive and to compensate for damages arising out of this omission, Andrea
Francovich and Others v Italian Republic, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90,
reprinted in (1991) European Court Reports 5357.
95 American Convention art 63 1144 UNTS 123.
96 See the 1988 Velasquez Rodriguez decision, Ser C No 4 in (1988) 9 Human Rights
Law Journal 212, par 134 and in (1989) 28 International Legal Materials 291.
97 See art 27 s 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The
Protocol can be retrieved at http://www.africa-union.org/home/welcome.htm
under [treaties].
  Chapter 1    113.3 Shortcomings 
Pursuing civil remedies for human rights atrocities suffers from
apparent shortcomings. Firstly, the above-mentioned international
provisions, which acknowledge in general the possibility of granting
financial remedies to the individual victim, provide neither a direct
procedure for the individual victim to proceed with a financial claim,
nor a judicial forum that is directly accessible to the individual
claimant. The ICCPR’s UNCHR — the only international treaty body
with proven relevance in individual remedies in the international field
— has the right to grant financial remedies only in the context of
already processed individual complaint procedures. The UNCHR does
therefore not resemble an explicit forum for the adjudication of
financial claims of an individual victim. In this context, financial
claims can only be made during a complaint or communication
procedure that has already commenced. As a consequence, the ICCPR
with its UNCHR constitutes only an indirect and weak procedure,
lacking power to force a perpetrator state to process financial claims
of the individual human rights victim generally. Given the difficulties
documented in part A concerning compliance with the UNHRC’s
findings, combined with lengthy individual communication
procedures, the few findings of the UNHRC have failed to establish the
necessary consuetudo98 in international human rights law.
The situation under the regional human rights regimes is only
slightly better.99 The ECtHR, for example, ‘does not acknowledge a
[general and independent] right to financial compensation in all
instances of violations […] irrespective of the gravity of the breach’.
The dictum in the case McCann v United Kingdom,100 confirmed this
view when the Court held that while there had been a violation of
article 2101 of the European Convention by the UK through the actions
of security organs, a further claim for financial damages under article
41 of the European Convention had to be dismissed as being
inappropriate because the slain terrorists had without doubt intended
to carry out a terrorist bombing in Gibraltar.102 
98 Tomuschat (n 68 above) 167.
99 Tomuschat (n 68 above) 162 et seq for a comprehensive evaluation of the present
practice. 
100 App No 18984/91 (1996) EHRR 97. Three members of the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) were shot dead by British security organs in Gibraltar, Spain, on 6 March
1988. This counterintelligence based military operation led to questions regarding
the legality of such a ‘hit’ and military operations in asymmetric conflict
scenarios. 
101 As above par 214. In contrast hereto stands the prior decision of the then
European Commission on Human Rights which found that the acts of the UK did
not violate art 2 of the European Convention on the grounds that the use of lethal
force had been a justifiable exception, having been absolutely necessary for the
purpose of ‘defending other persons from unlawful violence’. As above, paras
250-251.
102 As above paras 8 and 219.
12    Part AThe ECtHR found in three recent judgments, Al Adsani v United
Kingdom,103 Fogarty v United Kingdom,104 and McElhinney v
Ireland,105 that conferring civil immunity on foreign states for the
adjudication of claims arising out of human rights related violations
under provisions of UK legislation106 was lawful and thus did not
violate the victim or plaintiff’s right to a fair trial under article 6(1)
of the European Convention.107 The dicta of the court was even more
surprising, given that the court acknowledged in the Al Adsani case
that the alleged human rights violations were acts of torture and as
such jus cogens violations, punishable as an international108 and
domestic109 crime and constituting a violation of article 3 of the
European Convention as well. In Al Adsani the court effectively
restored the traditional, absolute concept of state immunity, refusing
to extend the findings of the Law Lords in Pinochet110 to civil
proceedings111 and refusing to acknowledge the changes with regard
to civil immunity for certain international crimes, such as torture and
terrorism, in the jurisdictions of other states.112 It remains an open
question whether the Pinochet decision of the Law Lords has
influenced the opinion of the British judiciary in general.113  
A victim’s right to financial redress under the European
Convention remains therefore subject to his or her home state’s
internal domestic law with only very few exceptions permissible
under the European Convention.114 In contrast, the difficulties of the
Inter-American regime of human rights protection in establishing a
strong human rights civil adjudication are different: The lack of
103 App No 35763/97 Judgment 1 Nov 2001 in (2002) EHRR 273.
104 App No 37112/97 Judgment 21 Nov 2001 in (2002) EHRR 302. 
105 App No 31253/96 Judgment 21 Nov 2001 in (2002) EHRR 322. All three decisions
can be retrieved from the Court’s homepage http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
106 Here under sec 1(1) UK State Immunity Act 1978 c 33, reprinted in (1978)
International Legal Materials 1123, whereby ‘a state is immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except as provided in the
following provisions of this part of this Act’.
107 See Strydom & Bachmann (n 32 above) for a detailed evaluation of the three
cases; also Voyiakis ‘Access to court v state immunity’ (2003) 52 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 297-332. Note the further discussion of the topic of
civil immunity for state human rights violations in para 2.3 above.
108 As stipulated in art 4 of CAT.
109 Torture is a crime in the UK under sec 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988.
110 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No
3) (HL) (E) [2000] in 1 AC 147.
111 Judgment (n 103 above) 61.
112 Eg, the US FSIA was amended in 1996 by the AEDPA to preclude state immunity in
cases of extrajudicial killings, terrorism and torture, see for a detailed account
para 2.3.1 below.
113 See eg the Crown’s Court of Appeal’s 2004 decision in Ronald Grant Jones v The
Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya as Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia) & Anor in [2004] EWCA Civil 1394 where the Court limited the
applicability of sovereign immunity protection in cases of jus cogens violations by
individual state agents.
114 Tomuschat (n 74 above) 164, discussing other recent decisions of the ECtHR,
identifying a change in case law towards a more applicant-‘friendly’
jurisprudence. 
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creation of strong Inter-American human rights adjudication. 
As early as 1988, with its decision in Velasquez Rodriguez v
Honduras,115 the IACtHR set a precedent of holding states financially
liable for human rights atrocities. The Court has so far delivered more
than 41 judgments on state responsibility for human rights violations
and have ordered respective states to pay reparations.116 However,
as just mentioned, the Court’s lack of power to execute its
judgments117 has stymied the creation of a strong legacy of state
accountability for human rights violations in that region.118 
4 Conclusion
This chapter concludes with two findings. Firstly, the concept of state
liability for human rights violations has developed into a principle
that has received some recognition under international law. In
theory, the move from sole inter-state responsibility for international
wrongs towards intra-state liability has been especially pronounced
for human rights violations that constitute jus cogens violations.
However, international law still follows the ‘traditional’ concept of
international state responsibility whereby the claim-holder could only
be a state as opposed to the individual victim. The latter, while being
nominally the right holder, is left without a personal actionable claim
and still depends on his or her home state who, as parens patriae, is
to pursue claims on his or her behalf. Therefore, the traditional
notion prevails that only states ‘have the right and an interest to bring
an [civil] action against the offending state’119 and not the individual
115 ‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights: judgment in Velasquez Rodriguez Case’,
reprinted in (1989) International Legal Materials 291.
116 See http://www.corteidh.or.cr/serie_c/index.html; Laplante ‘Bringing effective
remedies home: the Inter-American human rights system, reparations, and the
duty of prevention’ (2004) 22 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 351 and
Shelton Remedies in international human rights law (2005) 468-477.
117 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) can only request
information on measures adopted by member states and not force a state to
comply with its findings or follow its recommendations. A charter-based adoption
of an increased intervention mechanism for organs of the Organisation of
American States (OAS) that will guarantee compliance with IACHR’s findings shall
be sought as a probable addition to the American Convention’s existing art 73
that refers only to sanctions in general.
118 Tomuschat (n 68 above) 172 provides a more disheartening account of the IACHR’s
adjudication.
119 See UNCHR ‘Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms’ UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/1993/8 18. This opinion follows art 31 para 2 of
the ‘Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts’ (n
42 above) and Commentary (n 47 above) 225.
14    Part Avictim.120 The UNCC has followed this notion in its rules of procedure
whereby governments exclusively, and not individual claimants, have
the right to submit claims.121 Secondly, the few exceptions under
international and regional human rights law, discussed above, that
grant the individual victim a limited right to financial redress for
suffering fail to create a situation in which the establishment of
states’ civil accountability for human rights becomes automatic.
One has to conclude that in the international legal community in
general, and among the respective human rights organs, in particular,
a growing resolve and determination exist to establish more effective
ways of holding states accountable for human rights atrocities.
However, not having an international regime on civil state
accountability that grants the individual victim the undisputed
position of claim holder with necessary procedural and enforcing
means, needs attention of the international legal community. 
120 See ‘Report on civil actions in the English courts for serious human rights
violations abroad’ of the International Law Association Human Rights Committee
(British Branch) (Hereafter Report of the International Law Association Human
Rights Committee) (2001) EHRR 138, 150. 
121 Art 5 of the UNCC’s ‘Provisional rules for claims procedure’ (n 62 above).
Chapter 2
Adjudicating human rights atrocities in
domestic jurisdictions
1 Introduction 
Considering limitations of supranational human rights regimes — prior
exhaustion of domestic legal remedies, a lack of independent forums
and the non-existence of a guaranteed principle lending an individual
the standing of a claim holder — measures for obtaining financial
redress granted by domestic provisions are increasingly important for
the individual victim of human rights atrocities. With this in mind, the
following chapter summarises the present legal situation regarding
the assertion of a civil human rights action in selected domestic
jurisdictions.
2 Civil liability for human rights atrocities before US 
courts 122
2.1 Overview
This summary starts with the US because of the country’s reasonably
well-developed human rights adjudication system for foreign
litigants. Human rights litigation before US courts commenced in 1980
with the landmark decision of Filartiga v Pena-Irala,123 when the
Second Circuit Federal Court found that acts of (state) torture,
committed outside US territory involving only non-US citizens, both as
victims and perpetrators, could initiate a successful civil action
before US federal courts. The court based the necessary jurisdiction
ratione materiae of US federal courts on the Alien Torts Claims Act124
122 Certain themes of this chapter was discussed in Bachmann (n 32 above).
123 (1980) 630 F 2d 876 (2d Cir).
124 28 USC § 1350. ATCA is sometimes referred to as the Alien Torts Statute (ATS).
1215
  Chapter 2    16(ATCA), a statute from 1789 which had been dormant for nearly 200
years.125
During the last 25 years more than a hundred civil liability cases
for alleged gross human rights violations were brought before US
federal courts under ATCA,126 the supplementary Torture Victim
Protection Act127 (TVPA) of 1991 and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act128 (AEDPA) of 1998.129
This form of litigation became known to the broader South African
public through the Apartheid130 class action proceedings now pending
on appeal before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. As early as 2002
three different groups of victims organised themselves as plaintiffs in
the matter131 and subsequently became involved in various media
campaigns to solicit support for their plight and to enlighten the South
African public on the possibilities that could be locked up in such
trans-national proceedings. Needless to say, their legal counsel was
just as excited about the prospects.
Human rights adjudication under ATCA has led to the successful
suing of individuals as ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ instigators of egregious
human rights atrocities, some highly politicised suits against states
and an increasing number of lawsuits against multi-national
corporations (MNCs) for alleged participation in human rights atro-
cities committed abroad by repressive regimes. US human rights
litigation is remarkably wide in its scope: Individuals have the right to
assert legal actions against foreign individuals, judicial persons and
even states (on a limited scale) for human rights violations. Through
its focus on the individual perpetrator — being a natural person or a
corporate, legal person — human rights litigation under ATCA has
potential for deterring potential perpetrators. Human rights litigation
in the US therefore breaks with the traditional, continental common-
law view, where in cases of state wrongs the claim-holder could only
be a state and not an individual victim. It therefore merges different
125 ATCA was only used on a few occasions prior to Filartiga resulting in less than 30
court findings, See ‘Symposium on corporate liability for violations of
international human rights law’ (Symposium hereafter) in (2001) 114 Harvard Law
Review 2033.
126 Human rights litigation in the US is based mainly on ATCA and TVPA; consequently,
the term ‘ATCA’ refers to an action brought before US courts under any of these
statutes.
127 28 U S C § 1331 Pub L No 102-256, 106 Stat 73, which extends the scope of civil
actions to US citizens for torts of torture and extrajudicial killings as well.
128 28 U S C § 1605(a)(7) (1998). Permitting actions against designed states of state
sponsored international terrorism.
129 Symposium (n 125 above) 2033 et seq.
130 In re South African Apartheid Litigation (2004) 346 F Supp 2d 538 (SDNY);
Apartheid class action hereafter.
131 These three groups were the Ntsebeza, the Digwamaje and the Khulumani
plaintiffs, with the latter comprising 32 700 individuals, Apartheid class action (n
130 above) 545-546.
  Chapter 2    17phases of legal development within the concept of state
accountability. Consequently, adjudication under ATCA and its
instruments could develop into a new, potentially powerful way of
protecting human rights.
2.2 The laws
2.2.1  The Alien Torts Claims Act 
ATCA132 was enacted in 1789 as a domestic law which allowed for the
adjudication of torts committed by an alien against an alien. ATCA
confers subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court when the
following conditions are met: (1) an alien plaintiff sues; (2) for tort
only; (3) based on an act that was committed in violation of either the
law of nations133 or a treaty of the US.134  
The law of nations is defined by customary usage and clearly
articulated principles of the international community. However, not
all violations of international law are actionable under ATCA. In
general, only human rights violations of a serious nature are
actionable. During the 25 years since the Filartiga judgment,135 US
courts have developed certain norms and criteria that, if breached,
could qualify as violations of the law of nations and therefore as torts
actionable under ATCA.
In Forti v Suarez-Mason,136 the ‘law of nation’ test137 was
developed, requiring the ‘universal, definable and obligatory’138
character of the an international norm. A violation of international
human rights and international humanitarian law, as codified in
several multilateral treaties and conventions, could qualify as a
132 The terms ATCA and ATS (Alien Torts Statute) are used interchangeably in this
study.
133 Which was originally regarded as addressing only states with their respective
state actors. In Kadic v Karadzic, the 2nd Circuit found that certain international
crimes such as genocide resembled exceptions to that rule. (1995) 70 F 3d 232 (2d
Cir) 239-241.  
134 28 USC § 1350 reads: ‘The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States’.
135 Filartiga defined torts actionable under the ATCA as ‘of mutual, and not merely
several, concern, by means of express in international accords, that a wrong
generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning
of the [ATCA] statute’. 630 F 2d at 888.
136 (1987) 672 F Supp (ND Cal) 1531.
137 This test became recognised as the so-called Forti test. The US Supreme Court
referred to this test in its Sosa v Alvarez-Machain decision (2004) 542 US 692, 124
S Ct 2739 (Sosa hereafter). The Forti test consists actually of two parts, Forti I
and II with the former outlining the requirements for the jus cogens nature of
actionable torts and the latter defining the ‘universality’ criteria thereof, see
Stephens & Ratner International human rights litigation in US courts (1996) 51-
52.
138 (1987) 672 F Supp (ND Cal) 1539-1540.
18    Part Aviolation of the law of nations under these specific criteria and could
therefore establish the legal grounds of a civil action against an alien
defendant, who has to be present or otherwise represented in the US
when summons is served.139 Today, the following human rights
violations may establish jurisdiction of US federal courts under ATCA,
the TVPA and the AEDPA: torture; summary execution or extrajudicial
killing; genocide; war crimes and crimes against humanity;
disappearances; arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment; terrorism as well as hostage-taking.140
2.2.2 The Torture Victim Protection Act 
The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) of 1991 broadened the
scope of human-rights litigation in the US by establishing civil liability
for acts of torture and extra-judicial killings. Section 2(a) states that: 
[A]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or colour of law,
of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an
individual to extra-judicial killing, shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to the individual’s legal representative, or any person who may
be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. 
The TVPA is important in two ways. First, its scope of applicability
includes US plaintiffs as well and, secondly, it also targets state-
sponsored human rights violations of only mid-level intensity. 
The following four requirements141 have to be fulfilled in order to
establish a successful case:
(1) the defendant must have committed an act of torture or an
extra-judicial killing; 
(2) the defendant must have acted under actual or apparent
authority, or colour of law, of a foreign nation; 
(3) the plaintiff must be a victim, the victim’s legal representative,
or a person who may be a claimant in a wrongful death action; and 
(4) the plaintiff has to have exhausted legal remedies available in
the country where the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. 
Unlike ATCA, the TVPA has a provision of limitation, which sets
the limitations period at ten years. ATCA ‘borrows’ this provision of
limitation from the TVPA. The TVPA can be regarded as a pendant to
ATCA, explicitly focusing on adjudicating the international crime of
torture before US federal courts. It is a legislative response to a
particular breach of international law.
139 The so-called personal service requirement of, eg, summons as stipulated in Fed
R Civ P 4 8(e)(2).
140 See Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 63-92.
141 Ratner & Abrams (n 29 above) 207.
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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was
enacted in 1996 in response to the growing threat of international
terrorism against the US and limits state immunity in cases of state
terrorism.143 The AEDPA permits a claim of damages against a state
sponsor of international terrorism for personal injury or death caused
by acts of torture, extra-judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage-
taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an
act if the official agent of the foreign state performed the act or
provided support and this support fell within the scope of his or her
duties. It therefore amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)144 to permit a civil suit if the following requirements are met:
(1) the foreign state was designated145 as a state sponsor of terrorism
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979146 or
section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961147 at the time of
the commission of the act; (2) the act was committed within the
designated state and there was a reasonable opportunity for the state
to arbitrate the claim; and (3) the claimant was not a US national.
2.3 Limitations to US human rights litigation and their exceptions
2.3.1 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act  
The FSIA was passed in 1976 and lays down certain exceptions to state
immunity, which were regarded until then as absolute. Examples of
such exceptions are cases where immunity was waived, cases of
litigation involving commercial activity undertaken by the sovereign
in the US and, more relevant to human rights, cases in which the
sovereign is alleged to have committed a tort resulting in injury within
the US.148
The FSIA limits the range and scope of ATCA litigation. The
Supreme Court ruled in 1989 in Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp,149 that, in general, save for some exceptions as
142 28 USC § 1605 (a)(7) (1998).
143 Prominent examples of pre-9/11 terrorist attacks against the US were the 1993
basement bombing of the WTC, the bombing of the US Khobar Towers barracks in
Saudi Arabia in 1996, the bombing of US embassies in East Africa in 1998 and the
seaborne attack on the US warship Cole in Yemen in 2000.
144 28 USC §§ 1602-1605. 
145 States designated by the US Department of State as state sponsors of terrorism in
2004 were Cuba, Iran, Libya, the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, Sudan
and Syria. Compare http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2004/31644.htm.
146 50 USC § 2405(j) (1994).
147 22 USC § 2371 (1994).
148 28 USC § 1605.
149 488 US 428 (S Ct 1989). The Court further laid out the requirements whereby a
foreign state could waive its immunity.
20    Part Acontained in the FSIA, a foreign state was immune from suit.150 This
exemption from US jurisdiction also applies to cases of gross human
rights violations which might qualify as jus cogens in international
human rights law. The DC Circuit Court therefore found in the 1994
decision of Princz v Federal Republic of Germany,151 — concerning
claims of a Holocaust survivor against Germany for his suffering in the
concentration camps — that ‘even the most grievous human rights
violations do not evince a foreign sovereign’s intention to submit to
suit in the United States’.152
The commercial activity exception of the FSIA153 whereby a
commercial activity must have been carried out by the sued state,
allows for a civil action under strict conditions. In the context of
human rights litigation, the third clause of section 1605(a)(2) applies
according to which this activity must have occurred ‘elsewhere’, that
is, outside US territory. The main difficulty for plaintiffs in any civil
litigation against states is therefore to prove that the alleged human
rights violation qualifies as commercial activity. This has to be done
with reference to the nature of the conduct.154 In the case of a civil
action this means that the foreign state acts through its organs ‘in the
manner of a private player’ in order to apply the commercial activity
exception.155 So far, all attempts to invoke this exception and
establish jurisdiction before US courts have been unsuccessful.156
Besides these exceptions, this bar can only be overcome by means of
the 1996 AEDPA157 for state-sponsored terrorism. 
2.3.2 The head-of-state doctrine
In terms of this doctrine, an action against a foreign head of state is
futile since the head of a foreign nation enjoys the same immunity
from the jurisdiction of US courts as the state itself. One line of
thought holds that head-of-state immunity derives from the com-
mon law and promotes ‘comity among nations by ensuring that
leaders can perform their duties without being subject to deten-
tion, arrest or embarrassment in a country’s foreign legal
150 As above 443; the Court found that FSIA was the ‘sole basis’ for jurisdiction in
state liability cases. The US Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals
holding of September 1987 because a violation of international law would
establish subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds of ATCA, reprinted in (1987)
26 International Legal Materials 1374, thus ruling that ATCA did not do away with
sovereign immunity. See also Symposium (n 125 above) 2033, 2035. 
151 (1994) 26 F 3d 1166 1173 (D C Cir).
152 As above 1174.
153 28 USC § 1605(a)(2)
154 28 USC § 1603 (d).
155 Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc 504 US 607 (1992) at 614.
156 See eg the cases Saudi Arabia v Nelson 507 US 349 (1993), Cicippio v Islamic
Republic of Iran (1994) 30 F 3d 164 (D C Cir) and Hwang Geum Joo, et al v Japan
(2001) Civil Action 00-02233 (HHK) (DC Cir).  
157 See 2.2.3 above.
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waived. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, rejected the bid of former
Philippines president Marcos for immunity because the new
government of the Philippines had sought to waive his immunity.
Granting him immunity would therefore have weakened the idea of
promoting comity among nations and would have been detrimental to
the interests of both states. Traditionally, the executive branch has
the authority to define who should be entitled to immunity. In the US,
the Department of State as part of the executive branch has more
recently limited head-of-state immunity only to acts that are
inherently governmental or public in nature.159
Another approach is based on the FSIA. Courts in the US differ on
whether individuals — including heads of state — fall within the FSIA’s
scope. The Ninth Circuit concluded in Chuidian v Philippine National
Bank,160 that an individual acting in his or her official capacity on
behalf of a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity under the FSIA.
The decision was based on section 1603(b) of the FSIA, which defines
a ‘foreign state’ to include ‘an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state’161 which further includes ‘any entity […] which is a separate
legal person, corporate or otherwise, and which is an organ of a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof’.162 The court explained
that the terms ‘organ’ and ‘agent’ ‘do not in their typical legal usage
necessarily exclude individuals’.163 The direct application of the FSIA
for the purpose of individual immunity therefore eliminated the role
of the Department of State to determine immunity. However, this
view was challenged in Lafontant v Aristide,164 where it was stated
that ‘immunity only extends to the person the United States
government acknowledges as the official head-of-state’.165 Recog-
nition of a government and its officers is the exclusive function of the
executive branch: ‘[T]he courts must defer to the Executive
determination. Presidential decisions to recognize a government are
binding on the courts, and the courts must give them legal effect’.166
Consequently, the status of head-of-state immunity still remains
uncertain in light of the passage of the FSIA.167
158 (1987) 817 F 2d 1108 (4th Cir).
159 See George ‘Head-of-state immunity in the United States courts: still confused
after all these years’ (1995) 64 Fordam Law Review 1055-1056.
160 (1990) 912 F 2d 1095 (9th Cir).
161 28 USC § 1603 (b).
162 Chuidian 912 F 2d 1100.
163 As above 1101.
164 (1994) 844 F Supp128 (E D N Y).
165 Concurring in Kadic v Karadzic 70 F 3d 244, whereas the recognition of a state and
its organs is a precondition for the enjoyment of head-of-state immunity. 
166 As above 132-33.
167 Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 127 et seq.
22    Part AIn conclusion, it should be stated that cases brought before US
courts under ATCA before 1996 were only successful in respect of the
FSIA when they were directed against an individual who acted outside
his or her official authority. US human rights litigation has therefore
departed from the traditional view that state immunity is an absolute
bar to court proceedings with its judicial construction of declaring
certain human rights violations, such as summary executions and
torture, as falling outside the scope of official governmental acts.168
Recent equivocal decisions of UK civil courts on third state liability for
jus cogens violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law indicate Crown’s courts’ ambivalence towards addressing this
difficult topic.169
2.3.3 The ‘political question’ doctrine 
This limitation is used as a justification for a motion to dismiss a case
of human rights litigation before US courts in cases where one or more
factors are present which may compromise the justiciability of a case.
In Baker v Carr,170 the US Supreme Court cited matters involving
foreign affairs and the exercise of executive powers that fall within
the political question doctrine. The political question doctrine
consequently does not abrogate the existence of federal judicial
power but merely limits its exercise.171 It has further qualified the
‘political question’ with two considerations: ‘The appropriateness
under our system of government of attributing finality to the action
of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria
for a judicial determination’.172 
According to experienced human rights litigation lawyers, only the
argument that civil action may question the conduct of the US could
hold.173 Such a situation could appear when a ‘judicial resolution of a
question would contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch
168 As above 131 and Tomuschat (n 68 above) for further references to US criminal
and civil case law supporting this view.
169 See under 3.2 below.
170 369 US 186 (1962).
171 As above 217. 
172 As above 210.
173 Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 141 with further references. 
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interfere with important governmental interests’.174 
2.3.4 The act of state doctrine
This doctrine defines the conditions for when the judicial branch is
prohibited from examining the validity of a foreign sovereign’s act,
regardless of the existence of possible international law infringe-
ments.175 It therefore constitutes quite a powerful obstacle to
successful ATCA litigation. The act of state doctrine has the potential
to undermine ATCA litigation in cases where human rights violations
were authorised or encouraged by the ruling government itself. The
doctrine limits the federal court’s ability to pass on the validity of a
foreign nation’s conduct under international law.
In Republic of the Philippines v Marcos,176 the Ninth Circuit
refused to apply the act of state doctrine to shield the activities of
former Philippines president Marcos. It restricted the scope of
applicability in cases where the conduct of a regime which is no longer
in power is subject to a civil action by a current government. It
concluded that
as a practical tool in keeping the judicial branch out of the conduct of
foreign affairs, the classification of ‘act of state’ is not a promise to the
ruler of any foreign country that his conduct, if challenged by his own
country after his fall, may not become the subject of scrutiny in our
courts.177
2.3.5 The objection of forum non conveniens 
A court can refuse to hear a case, even when all other requirements
are met, on the ground that it is not the proper forum. Whether or not
to exercise jurisdiction is based on the forum non conveniens doctrine
which allows a court to dismiss a case based on the contention that
another venue under a foreign state’s jurisdiction provides a more
appropriate forum.178 It is not unusual for US federal courts to dismiss
174 Kadic v Karadzic 70 F 3d 249. The so called Statement of interest which is issued
by the State Department and sent to the courts in cases where the US has an
interest in a dismissal because of possible interference with state policy, has no
legal power to force courts to comply. Important recent decisions using this
doctrine are the ‘Holocaust slave labour’ cases, see In re: Nazi Era Cases Against
German Defendants Litigation (2000) 198 F R D 429 (D N J). See 2.4.4 below.
175 This doctrine had been identified and elaborated on in Banco Nacional de Cuba v
Sabbatino 376 US 398 (1964) 401.
176 (1988) 862 F 2d 1355 (9th Cir).
177 As above 1360.
178 The following reasons may give way for such a dismissal: the proximity of
evidence, the availability of an alternative venue, practical considerations such
as costs incurred and the interests of the jurisdiction in trying a case, see
Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 151-154. 
24    Part AATCA-based corporate lawsuits because of this doctrine. However,
many appellate courts have overturned these dismissals and restored
the balance of the parties’ interests in favour of the plaintiff or
appellant’s choice of judicial forum.179 The courts thereby gave way
to the growing resolve in the US legal community to prevent the
commission of severe human rights atrocities on a global scale by
adjudicating them before US courts. The enactment of the TVPA180 is
a further illustration. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed
these considerations in Wiwa,181 when it overturned the dismissal on
grounds of forum non conveniens by the Southern District of New York
Court, stating that the plaintiffs would put themselves in grave danger
if they return to their home country to process their action there in
particular, and that, in general, a US court would be a more suitable
forum in matters involving human rights violations of such a grave
nature. 
2.3.6 Further limitations to US human rights litigation 
A future obstacle to successful human rights litigation exclusively
based on the US system arises out of doubts as to whether one state’s
judicial fora would be appropriate for the adjudication of
international torts committed worldwide. Interestingly, this addi-
tional forum non conveniens objection is raised by a very diverse
group of critics. On the one side there are US objectors fearing a
possible infringement upon US economic and political interests world-
wide if the US were to become a global forum for human rights
litigation, especially for corporate human rights violations. Their
motivation seems to indicate an isolationist or even patriotic concern
for the protection of US interests.182 The other objection to the appa-
rent universality of the US courts comes from outside the US. Critics
fear the emergence of an omnipotent US jurisprudence that would
eventually turn out to be inapplicable in civil proceedings worldwide,
and that this would reverse the positive developments towards civil
179 Aguinda v Texaco Inc (2002) 303 F 3d 470 (2d Cir); Sarei et al v Rio Tinto, et al
(2002) 221 F Supp 2d 1116 (C D Cal).
180 Extending US jurisdiction over foreign nationals for acts of torture committed
outside of the US against both US citizens and non-citizens.
181 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co 226 F d 88, 157 Oil & Gas Rep 1, 31
Environmental Law Reports (2000) 20, 166 (2d Cir) (NO 99-7223L, 99-7245XAP),
reversing the District Court’s prior dismissal in Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co
et al No 96 CIV 8386 (KMW) (SDNY 1998). 
182 Former president Reagan and the present president George Walker Bush II are two
proponents of this group. The most recent attempt by politicians to limit the
scope of ATCA was senator Feinstein’s proposed Alien Tort Statute Reform Act,
which she introduced to Congress on 17 October 2005. It excludes war crimes
from ATCA jurisdiction and cases where a foreign state has perpetrated the
crimes within its territorial boundaries, see 109th Congress, 1st session S 1874 Sec
1350(a). A further analysis of the impact of these limitations on ATCA and US
human rights litigation lies outside the scope of this research.
  Chapter 2    25accountability for human rights atrocities.183 They seem to forget,
however, that in 1980 it was former president Jimmy Carter who
encouraged and supported the commencement of the Filartiga
proceedings and therefore helped ‘jumpstart’ the US human rights
litigation with its subsequent global impact on the adjudication of
human rights.
The US Supreme Court’s more recent Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,184
decision exemplifies the present legal dispute between the US
government and US human rights community.185 The petitioner,
assisted by the present administration’s Justice Department, opted
for a severe limitation of ATCA’s scope by arguing that this statute
constituted merely a grant for jurisdiction before US federal courts
and did not provide the legal grounds for tort action in the US.186 This
opinion was vehemently challenged by the human rights community
as in effect ‘gutting’ ATCA and denying 24 years’ (since the 1980
Filartiga precedent), successful human rights litigation.187 The Court
rejected the petitioner’s opinion and held that while ATCA is in its
terminology only jurisdictional, it could also create a statutory cause
for action but only for certain defined acts. It demanded that for the
actionability of a breach of an international norm, the latter had to
be ‘specific’ or ‘definable’, ‘obligatory’ and ‘universal’,188 therefore
endorsing the Forti tests.189 The Court consequently denied the
applicability of ATCA as a statutory cause on the grounds that the
abduction and subsequent 24-hour detention of Alvarez did not
qualify as actionable under ATCA because this arbitrary arrest could
neither qualify as a breach of any US treaty obligation nor jus cogens
183 They base their criticism mainly on two particular characteristics of US civil
litigation, namely the jury system with their pre-juror selection and the awarding
of punitive damages at a scale that appears excessive to the European lawyer.
184 Sosa (n 137 above).
185 The facts of the case were briefly as follows: The US Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) suspected that the Mexican national Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) had been
involved in the 1985 torture and murder of one US DEA agent in Mexico. The DEA
with assistance of the Mexican national Sosa kidnapped Alvarez, held him
incommunicado for 24 hours and brought him to the US where he was handed over
to US authorities. In 1992, a criminal court cleared Alvarez of all charges. In 1993,
Alvarez sued the US for false arrest under the FTCA (§ 1346(b)(1) USC) and Sosa
among others for a violation of the law of nations under ATCA. Only the ATCA suit
was successful with a summary judgment of $25 000 in damages. A later appeal
judgment of the 9th Circuit reversed the FTCA dismissal while confirming the
ATCA judgment. See Sosa (n 137 above) par 1 for a summary of the facts.
186 See Brief of petitioner 23 January 2004 No 03-339 at (i) under questions 1 and 2.
187 See Hermer & Day ‘Helping Bush bushwack justice’ Guardian 27 April 2004,
retrievable at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2004/0427/whack.
html and Sebok ‘The Supreme Court confronts the Alien Tort Claims Act: should
the court gut the law, as the administration suggests?’ at http://writ.
corporate.findlaw.com/scripts/sebok/20040322.html.
188 Sosa (n 137 above).
189 As above.
26    Part Aof international law and was thus only actionable under domestic
law.190
The importance of this judgment for the future of ATCA
adjudication lies in the renewed confirmation that ATCA remains the
appropriate forum for cases of gross violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law, and that it will not become too broad
in respect of less serious human rights violations that may already be
actionable under other statutes.191 This judgment keeps the scope of
ATCA focused on redressing severe suffering of individual victims and
does not water down the spectrum of future human rights
litigation.192
2.4 The development of human rights litigation in the US
2.4.1 The individual human rights perpetrator: Filartiga v 
Pena-Irala
As mentioned above, the history of successful human rights suits filed
under ATCA (and the TVPA) began in 1980, with the Second Circuit’s
decision in Filartiga v Pena- Irala,193 where the relatives of a
Paraguayan man, who was tortured and killed in custody of the
Paraguayan police, filed suit against the former Inspector General of
police while he was present in the US. The Second Circuit Court found
that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that torture was a violation
of the law of nations within the scope of ATCA.194 The court’s decision
was important in two ways. Firstly, it was the first time that plaintiffs
could litigate human rights abuses in federal courts despite the
absence of a direct connection to the US (other than that of the
defendant being present when served with the court summons) of
either the tortuous conduct or its effect. Secondly, the court’s
reliance on modern customary international law paved the way for
modern US adjudication of international crimes. With Filartiga the
doors of US federal courts opened for civil litigation in cases where
190 As above.
191 As above 2741, whereas ‘[d]istrict courts should exercise caution in deciding to
hear claims allegedly based on present-day law of nations under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), and should require any claim based on present-day law of nations
to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms, offences against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct and piracy,
that Congress had in mind when it enacted the ATS’.
192 Sebok regards the judgment as unsatisfying in regard to future human rights
litigation. ‘The Alien Torts Claims Act: how powerful a human rights weapon is it?
The Supreme Court gives some guidance, but not much’ at http://writ.
corporate.findlaw.com/scripts/sebok/20040712.html.
193 (1980) 630 F 2d 876 (2d Cir).
194 As above 884.
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human rights atrocities. 
2.4.2 The non-state actor: Kadic v Karadzic
This state actor or action requirement was upheld by the US federal
courts until 1995 when the Second Circuit of Appeal decided in Kadic
v Karadzic,195 that the applicability of ATCA and the more recent
TVPA of 1991 was to be extended to non-state actors for cases of gross
human rights offences.
In this politically charged case,196 two groups of Bosnian women
brought claims under ATCA and the TVPA against the Serb national
Karadzic before the District Court of Manhattan for alleged
participation in gross human rights violations such as genocide, rape,
forced prostitution, torture, execution and wrongful death. Karadzic
moved for dismissal on four different grounds: (1) insufficient service
of process; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction; and (4) non-justiciability of the plaintiffs’ claims.197 The
District Court held that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction
under ATCA because Karadzic, as president of an internationally
unrecognised state (Respublika Srpska),198 had acted as a private
actor and as such his acts did neither constitute violations of
international law or breaches of the law of nations as required by
ATCA; nor did they fulfil the requirement of governmental
involvement as stipulated by the TVPA. The plaintiffs challenged that
verdict by appealing to the Second Circuit of Appeal and argued
alternately that Karadzic has acted both as a private individual and as
president of the Srpska Republic. The Second Circuit found that the
Republic of Srpska met the requirements of statehood199 under
international law200 and that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under
ATCA and further that certain international crimes, forming part of
the jus cogens of international criminal law, such as ‘genocide, war
195 (1995) 70 F 3d 232 (2d Cir). The case was a consolidation of two suits brought on
behalf of two groups of defendants, namely a group of individuals and two
organisations Doe v Karadzic (No 93 Civ 878) and Kadic v Karadzic.
196 When the cases were brought before the 2nd Circuit Court, the civil war in Bosnia
and Hercegovina with its attended atrocities was at its height and became
subject to UN scrutiny. Before and during the filing period of the lawsuit, Karadzic
visited NY on three occasions on UN invitation. 
197 n 195 above, 237.
198 In 1992 the Bosnian Serbs had declared part of the then independent former
Yugoslavian Republic Bosnia and Hercegovina which was occupied by them as the
independent Republic of Srpska. This Republic was, however, never recognised by
the UN.
199 Territorial sovereignty, population and political leadership as the three governing
criteria of statehood.
200 (1995) 70 F 3d 232 (2d Cir) 243.
28    Part Acrimes and crimes against humanity’, could have been committed by
Karadzic ‘in his private capacity’.201
With Kadic v Karadzic the subject-matter jurisdiction of ATCA and
the TVPA was extended to include certain acts by non-state actors
because of the seriousness of violations. With the Second Circuit’s
ruling, jus cogens violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law became actionable under ATCA and the TVPA.202
But the Court went further when it found that other ‘common’ crimes
such as rape and extrajudicial killings were actionable under ATCA as
long as they were committed in furtherance of other jus cogens
crimes which do not require ‘state action’.203 
2.4.3 States as defendants 
Lawsuits against states are generally restricted by state immunity as
stipulated in the FSIA. The lawsuits Argentine Republic v Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp,204 and Princz v Federal Republic of Germany,205
are two examples of lawsuits that were unsuccessfully pursued
because of state immunity.
Lawsuits against states brought under ATCA and the TVPA are
more likely to be successful in cases of state-sponsored terrorism. An
important case in this respect is the Lockerbie litigation,206 which was
brought in connection with the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am
flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland. The explosion killed 259
passengers, crew members and 11 residents of Lockerbie. In 2001 the
Libyan intelligence agent Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed (aka al Megrahi)
was convicted of the bombing by the ‘Lockerbie’ court in the
Netherlands.207 
The first civil suit208 by 118 American representatives of victims
against the Libyan government in 1993 was rejected on the grounds of
state immunity under the FSIA. The plaintiffs argued that this case fell
under one of the FSIA’s exceptions to foreign state immunity.209 The
Second Circuit Court found, firstly, that Pan Am flight 103 was not to
201 As above 236.
202 As above 239-243.
203 As above 243-244, ‘are actionable […] without regard to state action, to the
extent that they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes’.
204 (1988) 488 US 428, 429; 109 S Ct 683. 
205 n 151 above, 1166.
206 See for the Lockerbie case (2001) 40 International Legal Materials 582 et seq.
207 The court was a Scottish court sitting in Camp Zeist, Netherlands. This had been a
precondition set by the Libyan government for the extradition of the two prime
suspects to a Scottish court. Ali Mohamed was sentenced to life in prison on 31
January 2001. His appeal was dismissed.
208 Smith v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1996) 101 F 3d 239 (2d Cir).
209 See 2.3 above for some examples of these exceptions and their position within
the system of obstructing a successful US human rights civil action. 
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within the non-commercial tort exception under the FSIA; thirdly, the
UN Security Council’s Resolution 748,210 whereby Libya was obliged to
pay compensation to the victims of the bombing, was not a binding
treaty obligation under article 25 of the UNCHR at the time of the
enactment of the FSIA and as such could not qualify as a waiver of
immunity under the Act; and, lastly, the international crime of
aviation terrorism did not constitute a ‘commercial act’ within the
commercial activity exception of 28 US C section 1605(2).211
Consequently, the court dismissed the civil suits.
As a consequence of pressure by families of victims and the public,
the FSIA was amended in 1996 by AEDPA, and this opened the way for
civil suits against foreign governments under the conditions outlined
above. Following the passage of the AEDPA many plaintiffs renewed
their suits.212 The Second Circuit Court ruled in Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Smith,213 that families of Lockerbie victims
could proceed with their claims for damages because of changes in
law, therefore rejecting the appellant’s (Libya’s) legal view that the
AEDPA resembled an impermissible ex post facto law.
The Lockerbie case came to an end through a different course of
events. In May 2002 the Libyan government offered the impressive
sum of $2.7 billion to compensate each of the 270 victims’ families in
exchange for the withdrawal of lawsuits and lifting of US and UN
sanctions against Libya. By compensating the victims, the Libyan
government would meet one of the conditions stipulated by the UN
Security Council as a requirement for lifting international sanctions
against the country.214 In August 2003, this settlement was concluded
by the legal and diplomatic representatives from US and Libya.215
In Alejandre v Cuba,216 and Flatlow v Iran,217 Cuba and Iran were
found liable as states for acts of extra-judicial killing.218 In the first
case Cuba was found liable for shooting down two unarmed civilian
planes over international waters — an act that was regarded as an
instance of extra-judicial killing within the AEDPA’s definition. Iran
was found liable for its support of the Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine
210 UN Doc S/RES/748 (1992).
211 Murphy (n 31 above) 35 and further annotations.
212 See eg Rein v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1998) 995 F Supp 325 (E
D N Y).
213 Case No 98 – 7467 (1998) US App (2d Cir) retrievable at http://www.findlaw.com/
2nd/987467.
214 Mail & Guardian 31 May 2002 ‘Lockerbie families offered $2.7bn’ at http://
archive.mg.co.za.
215 See Sebok ‘Libya, Lockerbie, and the long-delayed settlement relating to Pan Am
flight 103’ at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20020908.html.
216 (1997) 996 F Supp 1239 (S D Fla).
217 (1998) 999 F Supp 1 (D D C).
218 See Murphy (n 31 above) 40.
30    Part AIslamic Jihad, which launched a bombing attack on an Israeli bus,
killing and wounding a number of passengers.
In conclusion, one can state that as a consequence of severely
limited state liability adjudication under the provisions of the FSIA,
suits against governments have so far resulted only in out of court
settlements and no final judgments. Thus far, very few actions have
been successful under the AEDPA exceptions.
2.4.4 Important corporate lawsuits
2.4.4.1  The Wiwa and Unocal cases
Corporate mass tort litigation in the US commenced in 2000 with the
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Wiwa v Royal Dutch
Petroleum Company,219 to grant jurisdiction to US federal courts for
the adjudication of foreign corporate human rights violations which
were committed outside the US. The ruling renounced the earlier
forum non conveniens approach of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York220 and remanded221 the case back to the District
Court for further proceedings. On 28 February 2002 the District Court
denied the motions to dismiss on virtually all of the plaintiffs’ claims
and ruled that the plaintiffs’ allegations met the requirements of an
action under ATCA and qualified the actions of the defendant as
participation in crimes against humanity, torture, summary exe-
cution, arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment, and other violations of international law.222 The case is still
pending and its outcome unsure due to the defendants accusing the
plaintiffs of perjury.223
219 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co et al (n 181 above). This lawsuit was based on
the alleged involvement of the Royal Dutch/Shell oil group in human rights abuses
in Nigeria. The plaintiffs argued that the corporation had acted in complicity with
the Nigerian army in the 1995 murders of the environmental and community
leaders Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, the torture and detention of Owens
Wiwa, and the murder of another villager.
220 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had found
that there was personal jurisdiction, but dismissed the lawsuit on forum non
conveniens grounds, see Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co et al (n 181 above)
synopsis.
221 As above, the Court of Appeals held that ‘(1) New York investor relations office of
companies’ subsidiary was an “agent” of the companies for purposes of New
York’s personal jurisdiction statute; (2) companies, through such office, were
“doing business” in New York, as required to confer jurisdiction under the
statute; (3) subjecting companies to personal jurisdiction in New York did not
violate due process clause; and (4) district court failed to weigh all relevant
considerations in its forum non conveniens determination’.
222 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co 2002 WL 319887 (not reported) RICO Bus Disp
Guide 10 216 (SDNY 28 February 2002) (No 96 CIV 8386 (KMW)).
223 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co 2006 WL 870944 (S D N Y 31 Mar 2006) (No 96
CIV 8386 KMW HBP 01 CIV 1909 KMW HBP 02 CIV 7618 KMW HBP).
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taken a step further by the Unocal case224 — a lawsuit brought against
a US corporation for its complicity in alleged human rights violations
in the context of its business activities abroad. In 1996, 15
plaintiffs225 from Myanmar226 brought an ATCA lawsuit against the
California-based corporation alleging the corporation’s complicity in
widespread human rights abuses such as murder, rape and forced
labour committed by Myanmar’s security organs during the
construction of a $1.2 billion company oil pipeline. The Unocal case is
important in terms of ATCA litigation because of its procedural
history: The defendant’s counsel exploited all the   legal objections
discussed above. They argued that the case was increasingly
politicised within the human rights community and also argued that
such corporate liability cases would impair global economic interests
of the US — a view aligned with that of the political establishment.
The Ninth Circuit Court227 refused the initial motion to dismiss the
case on the grounds that the alleged (human rights) violations
constituted official acts of the state of Myanmar, and were thus
subject to the jurisdictional bars of act of state and/or state
immunity. The defendant then argued that US courts lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
establish that the defendant had committed a law of nations
violation. The Court followed this view and dismissed the case228 by
ruling that the plaintiff could not establish that the defendant had
committed actionable law of nations violations by exercising (direct)
control over Myanmar’s security organs or that he had participated in
the commission of these violations through knowledge and approval of
the methods applied by Myanmar’s security organs.229 This setback
for progressive human rights litigation lasted only until September
2002, when a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found the case actionable under ATCA and the TVPA and
reversed the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment in favour of
Unocal on claims for forced labour, murder and rape.230 
224 John Doe I v Unocal Corp (2005) 403 F 3d 708. 
225 The Unocal case comprises two actions brought before the District Court of
Central California: Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma v Unocal Inc
(1997) 176 FRD 329 334 (CD Cal) brought by four villagers, the Federation of Trade
Unions of Burma and the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma,
and Doe I v Unocal Corp (1997) 963 F Supp 880 883 (CD Cal) were brought by 14
villagers.
226 Formerly known as Burma.
227 See Doe v Unocal Corp (1997) 963 F Supp 880, 885-888 (CD Cal).
228 Doe v Unocal Corp (2000) 110 F Supp 2d 1294 (CD Cal) (No CV 96-6959 RSWL BQRX
CV 96-6112 RSWL BQRX).
229 As above 1307-1310.
230 Doe I v Unocal Corp (2002) 395 F 3d 932 (9th Cir (Cal)) (No 00-56603, 00-57195,
00-57197, 00-56628). Four appeals brought on behalf of the plaintiffs (Nos 00-
56603, 00-56628, 00-57195 & 00-57197) were consolidated.
32    Part AThe Court of Appeal found that Unocal’s corporate liability for
participation in the crime of forced labour could be established
through the ‘knowing practical assistance or encouragement to [the]
Myanmar military that had a substantial effect on [the] military’s
perpetration of forced labour imposed on area residents’,231 qualifying
as aiding and abetting of the crime in question. It further found that
the alleged acts of murder, rape and torture occurred in furtherance
of forced labour and was as such actionable under ATCA without the
existence of the state action requirement.232 
This decision sent shockwaves through the corporate world233 and
gave new hope to litigants in similar matters.234 In a subsequent
development, the Unocal case was admitted for a rehearing before an
11-judge en banc panel.235 However, the long-awaited hearing never
occurred because the parties settled out of court.236 An unfortunate
side effect of this settlement is that important legal questions
concerning corporate liability for human rights atrocities remain
unanswered. 
2.4.4.2  The Holocaust lawsuits
The first Holocaust class action (‘Holocaust I’) concerned the
corporate liability of Swiss banks for their treatment of Jewish clients
and other victims of Nazi persecution during and after World War II.
It raised important questions in respect of corporate business morals.
During 1996 in In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation,237 nearly 900
000 victims and victims’ relatives238 filed a class action against the
three largest Swiss banks alleging that Swiss banks had breached
international and national law by ‘knowingly retaining and concealing
the assets of Holocaust victims, accepting and laundering illegally
obtained Nazi loot and in transacting the profits of slave labour’.239
231 As above 934. 
232 As above, ‘the court finds that crimes like rape, torture, and murder, which by
themselves require state action for liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) to attach, do not require state action when committed in furtherance of
other crimes like slave trading, genocide or war crimes, which by themselves do
not require state action for ATCA liability to attach’.
233 Sebok describes the effect of the rulings in ‘Unocal announces it will settle a
human rights suit: what is the real story behind its decision?’ http://
writ.findlaw.com/sebok/20050110.html.
234 Apartheid class action (n 130 above).
235 Doe I v Unocal Corp (2003) 395 F 3d 978 (9th Cir (Cal)) (No 00-56603, 00-56628).
236 See press statement ‘Historic advance for universal human rights: Unocal to
compensate Burmese villagers’ retrievable at http://www.earthrights.org/news/
press_unocal_settle.shtml and John Doe I v Unocal Corp (2005) 403 F 3d 708
granting the parties’ motion to dismiss the case.
237 In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig (2000) 105 F Supp 2d 139 (E D N Y) (No 96 CIV
4849 ERKMDG 99 CIV 5161 97 CIV 461).
238 See Boyd ‘Collective rights adjudication in US courts: enforcing human rights at
the corporate level’ (1999) Brigham Young University Law Review 1155 et seq.
239 Apartheid class action (n 130 above).
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historic $1.25 billion settlement240 on condition that all future
litigation be terminated. 
The second Holocaust case (‘Holocaust II’), the Nazi slave labour
case,241 involved a class action against some DAX-listed242 German
corporations for the alleged use of forced ‘slave’ labour during World
War II by the defendant corporations and/or their legal predecessors.
This highly politicised case ended with a settlement in 1999 when the
defendant corporations and the German government agreed to
establish a jointly funded $5 billion foundation for compensating the
surviving victims of Nazi slave labour. The Foundation ‘Remembrance,
Responsibility and the Future’ was established in August 2000 by
German parliamentary law243 and has been compensating the
survivors ever since. In exchange, the plaintiffs agreed to provide the
German industry with legal peace. Contrary to the initial suspicion
that US courts would not honour this part of the settlement and
proceed with adjudicating individual suits, recent developments
indicate that US courts are respecting this undertaking.244
Positively assessed, these cases acknowledge victims’ suffering
and prove that accomplice firms can be called to book even years
after the event. One could also say that many victims gained a
personal victory in coping with their personal or their relatives’
suffering through their active role as plaintiffs in two of the largest
class actions in the history of the US. However, besides the intense
media coverage and public attention these cases generated, inter-
party settlements frustrated a final ruling that could have served as
legal precedent for similar cases. This does not impress from a human
rights law perspective, even less so when considering that these
settlements were at least partly coerced through immense diplomatic
pressure and by threat of indirect sanctions.245 The fact that two such
240 The official negotiations came to an end in August 1998. This settlement was
confirmed by the US Court for the Eastern District of New York in August 2000 and
the settlement made final through confirmation by the Second Circuit in July
2001, see In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig (2001) 14 Fed Appx 132 (2d Ct),
unpublished.
241 In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig (2000) 198 FRD 429 (DNJ)
MDL No 1337 DNJ Lead Civ No 98-4104 (WGB).
242 DAX is the acronym for Deutsche Aktien Index where the major German (public)
corporations are listed.
243 See the German Act Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung, Erinnerung,
Verantwortung und Zukunft of 2 August 2000 (Bundesgesetzblatt: BGBl 2000 I
1263).
244 n 240 above, where the District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the
last of more than 50 consolidated cases brought by individuals after the 2000
settlement on the grounds that the ‘plaintiff’s claims present non-justiciable
political questions and that the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in the
interest of international comity’.
245 For a critical description and evaluation of the proceedings and the accompanying
politics of ‘Holocaust’ litigation, see Finkelstein Die Holocaust industrie (2000). 
34    Part Aimportant mass litigation cases were settled out of court246 has as
consequence that ATCA was not effectively tested in court. As a
result, important legal questions for future human rights mass
litigation cases, such as subject matter jurisdiction over corporate
conduct247 and the political question issue, will remain controversial.
It also means that the scope remains for over-optimistic expectations
about the prospects of future settlements under ATCA-inspired
litigation. 
2.4.4.3 The apartheid lawsuit: In Re South African Apartheid 
Litigation 248
The US District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the class action of three groups of plaintiffs249 against over 30
multinational corporations that were engaged in business with
apartheid South Africa. The judgment is presently on appeal.
The defendants constitute the crème de la crème250 of the
international corporate world. They were listed in the lawsuit as
suppliers of resources such as technology, money and oil to the South
246 Sebok even doubts whether US citizens would have had locus standi in such civil
suits as the US governments excluded individual reparation claims against private
corporations in the Potsdam Agreements of 1945 and the 1953 London Debt
Agreement. See ‘Un-settling the Holocaust’ (Parts I and II) http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20000828.html and http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
sebok/200008289.html However, 1990’s ‘2 plus 4’ Peace Treaty on German
reunification and sovereignty did not address the topic of additional reparation
claims, and thus encouraged subsequent actions of slave labourers. 
247 See the findings on corporate human rights liability, above para 2.4.4. 
248 Apartheid class action (n 130 above).
249 Three groups of plaintiffs, the Ntsebeza, the Digwamaje and the Khulumani
plaintiffs, filed actions in a district court on behalf of all persons living in South
Africa between 1948 and the present and who suffered damages as a result of
apartheid. 
250 Rheinmetall Group, Barclays National Bank Ltd., Citigroup, Commerzbank,
Deutsche Bank, UBS AG, JP Morgan Chase, Ford Motor Co, Daimler Chrysler AG,
Fujitsu Ltd, IBM and dozens more.
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government under apartheid. The case is based on allegations that
the defendants violated international law and were therefore sub-
ject to legal suits before US federal courts under ATCA for
participating in or aiding or abetting forced labour, genocide, torture,
sexual assault, unlawful detention, extrajudicial killings, war crimes
and racial discrimination.251 These actions, the arguments suggest,
breached international law outlawing apartheid at the time.252
The plaintiffs sought inter alia equitable relief253 including
production of defendants’ documents, creation of an international
historical commission, affirmative action and educational pro-
grammes in addition to injunctive relief which would prevent the
defendants from destroying documents related to their investment in
apartheid South Africa. They further sought monetary relief in
addition to compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $400
billion and disgorgement of all monies that could be linked to aiding,
conspiring with, or benefiting from apartheid South Africa.
The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the
defendants engaged in state action by acting under colour of law in
perpetrating the alleged acts. Citing Bigio v Coca-Cola Co,254 the
Court concluded that an indirect economic benefit from unlawful
state action was insufficient to establish state action.255 The Court
then turned to the question of whether aiding and abetting
international law violations or doing business in apartheid South
Africa, qualified as violations of the law of nations. In this instance
the Court was apparently guided by the ruling in Sosa,256 namely, that
to fit the ATCA paradigm, violations of international law must be
understood as those ‘accepted by the civilized world and defined with
a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms’ such as piracy and crimes against ambassadors. It was
251 The plaintiffs argued that doing business with apartheid South Africa and aiding
or abetting international law violations committed by apartheid security forces
constituted violations of international law in themselves.
252 The plaintiffs argued that the acts would constitute, inter alia, violations of
international law which were established as universal norms by the Nuremberg
Trials of 1946, art 7(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, art 6(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, art 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 30 November 1973, 1015 UNTS 243, 245
and the UN General Assembly, which called apartheid a ‘crime against humanity’
in GA Res 3068 UN GAOR 28th Session Supp No 21 at 75 UN Doc A/9030 (1974). The
UN Security Council further declared that ‘all States shall cease forthwith any
provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types.’ UN SC
Resolution 418 UN SCOR 32d Session UN Doc S/INF/33 (1977), Apartheid class
action (n 130 above) 551.
253 This common-law remedy leaves granting actual relief solely to the court’s
discretion.
254 (2001) 239 F 3d 440 (2d Cir).
255 Apartheid class action (n 130 above) 539-540.
256 n 137 above.
36    Part Anoted in this context that the findings of the international criminal
tribunals, including those of Nuremberg, did not establish clearly
defined norms for ATCA purposes,257 nor binding sources of
international law.258 The Court further observed that the Apartheid
Convention, which dealt with the criminal repercussions for aiding
apartheid was not ratified by the major world powers, including the
United States, Great Britain, France, Canada and Japan. It concluded
that ‘[w]ithout the backing of so many major world powers, the
Apartheid Convention is not binding international law’.259
Consequently, in applying the Sosa test, the Court ruled that the
plaintiffs could not rely on the UN Charter and General Assembly
resolutions as these sources could not give rise to an action under
ATCA since they did not resemble binding customary international law
actionable under ATCA.260 The court therefore concluded that doing
business in apartheid South Africa was not a violation of international
law that would support jurisdiction in federal courts under ATCA.261
2.4.5 Mass torts and class actions
Closely related to the legal trend of suing corporations as a substitute
for states’ accountability is the evolution in the 1990s of mass tort
procedures, better known as class actions, within the ambit of ATCA
and the TVPA. Prominent examples are the two above-mentioned
Holocaust lawsuits against Swiss banks262 and German corporations263
and the most recent apartheid264 class action.265 Common to these
lawsuits is their nature: A limited number of plaintiffs, acting on
behalf of a far bigger group of victims, sue a multitude of corporate
defendants for their or their legal predecessors’ involvement in past
gross human rights violations. 
257 Apartheid class action (n 130 above) 550.
258 As above 553.
259 As above.
260 As above.
261 As above 554.
262 In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig (2000) 105 F Supp 2d (E D N Y) 139.
263 In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation (2000) 198 F R D (D N
J) 429.
264 In re South African Apartheid Litigation (n 130 above) See 2.4.4.3 above. The
decision of the SA government to join the defendants by filing an amicus curiae,
declaring that the case would interfere with the ongoing truth and reconciliation
process and further damage present and future business investment in South
Africa, seen against the background that the amount sought totals $400 x 109, had
already sparked a controversy in South Africa, see ‘It’s state v. apartheid victims’
Mail & Guardian 21 to 27 October 2005 5.
265 Prior to these cases Hilao v Estate of Marcos (1996) 103 F 3d 767 (9th Cir), Kadic v
Karadzic (1995) 70 F 3d 232 (2d Cir) and Doe I v Unocal Corp (1997) 963 F Supp
880 (C D Cal) were cases brought as class actions before US federal courts. See
Boyd (n 238 above) 1153-1157, for a conclusive summary of examples of class
action litigation. These three cases included class representation of up to 10 000
victims (Marcos) unlike the Holocaust cases which involved nearly a million
victims and relatives of victims. 
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of rule 23 of the Federal rules of civil procedure, as substantially
revised and adopted in 1966. Federal rule 23(a) sets forth four
prerequisites to asserting a class action: firstly, the sheer number of
parties makes a joinder of plaintiffs impracticable; secondly, common
issues of law and fact are in question; thirdly, the claims and defences
brought by the respective parties are typical; and, finally, the
adequacy of representation is guaranteed. After these threshold
requirements have been met the court has to determine whether the
class action resembles a ‘mandatory’ class action which requires no
further notice under paragraphs (1) and (2) of rule 23(b),266 or
whether the class action resembles the more common notice and opt
out of the class action as defined under rule 23(b)(3).  
In 2005 the availability and scope of class actions before state
courts for corporate misconduct involving multimillion-dollar claims
of plaintiffs representing thousands of affected individuals was
limited by the Class-Action Fairness Act.267 This limitation had
become necessary because an increasing number of class councils
filed actions in states which were known for granting often
exaggerated amounts of damages. At the signing ceremony on 18
February 2005, President George W. Bush had the following to say
about the Act: 268
The bill I’m about to sign is a model of effective, bipartisan legislation.
By working together over several years, we have agreed on a practical
way to begin restoring common sense and balance to America’s legal
system. The Class-Action Fairness Act of 2005 marks a critical step
toward ending the lawsuit culture in our country. The bill will ease the
needless burden of litigation on every American worker, business, and
family. By beginning the important work of legal reform, we are meeting
our duty to solve problems now, and not to pass them on to future
generations. [...] Class-actions can serve a valuable purpose in our legal
system. They allow numerous victims of the same wrongdoing to merge
their claims into a single lawsuit. When used properly, class-actions
make the legal system more efficient and help guarantee that injured
people receive proper compensation. [...] So the bill I sign today
maintain every victims right to seek justice [...] Class-actions can also
be manipulated for personal gain. Lawyers who represent plaintiffs from
266 The mandatory class action requires the existence of one or more of the following
conditions: the potential of a risk of inconsistent or incompatible standards of
conduct, the potential for adjudications that would be contrary to the interests
of the class, or a suggestion of injunctive relief or declaratory. See Boyd (n 238
above) 1183-1189.
267 See 109th Congress 1st Session S 5 retrievable at http://thomas.loc.gov.
268 See White House press release of 18 February 2005 ‘President signs Class-Action
Fairness Act of 2005’ http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/
print/20050218-11.html. In 2005 Madison county was listed with five others as a
judicial hell-hole, a term reserved for courts that have become known for
excessive awards that bankrupt businesses and cost jobs. See http://
www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
38    Part Amultiple states can shop around for the state court where they expect to
win the most money. [...] The number of class actions filed in Madison
County has gone from two in 1998 to 82 in 2004 — even though the vast
majority of the defendants named in those suits are not from Madison
County. [...] Before today, trial lawyers were able to drag defendants
from all over the country into sympathetic local courts, even if those
businesses have done nothing wrong. Many businesses decided it was
cheaper to settle the lawsuits, rather than risk a massive jury award.
Section 2 of the Act draws the Act’s rationale from a number of
consequences caused by the abuse of the class action device. Mention
is made, for instance, of the adverse effect on interstate commerce;
the undermining of public respect for the judicial system; the
awarding of large legal fees while claimants are left with awards of
little or no value; unjustified awards made to certain plaintiffs at
others’ expense; the publication of confusing notices preventing
claimants from effectively exercising their rights and decisions by
local and state courts to keep cases of national importance out of the
federal courts.
In the latter instance, section 4 of the Act now grants federal
district courts original jurisdiction in any civil action in which the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, excluding interest and
costs, and which is a class action between citizens of different federal
states, or between a foreign state — or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state — and a US citizen. This is based on the concept of federal
diversity jurisdiction which is exercised by a federal court in cases
involving parties from different states and was formerly regulated by
paragraph 1332 of the US Code.269 Under this provision an action was
subject to federal jurisdiction only if the parties were completely
diverse in the sense that no plaintiff was a citizen of the same state
where any of the defendants was deemed to be a citizen. Secondly,
each plaintiff had to assert a claim that was in excess of $75 000.
However, the way in which this provision was interpreted and applied
over the years allowed it to be circumvented and federal jurisdiction
avoided in the case of class actions. For instance, a plaintiff could
easily avoid federal jurisdiction by simply including in the class action
a non-diverse plaintiff or defendant. A second measure of avoidance
was that courts held that the jurisdictional amount requirement was
satisfied only when the claim of each and every member of the class
was separate and distinct and exceeded $75 000.270 Section 4 wants
to remedy this situation.
269 See Title 28 USC § 1332.
270 See further Beisner & Miller ‘Civil justice report: class action magnet courts – the
allure intensifies’ (2002) 7 accessible at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/
pdf/cjr_05.pdf. See also Petersen ‘Die Änderung im Recht der US-Sammelklagen
durch den Class Action Fairness Act of 2005’ in (2005) Recht der Internationalen
Wirtschaft 812-814.
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fees in class actions and for the protection of claimant rights, it is
debatable whether its scope of influence will also cover mass tort
claims for gross human rights violations of the kind dealt with by ATCA
and other legislative measures. In many of the matters under
discussion, the cause of action arose outside the United States and the
claimants were non-US citizens. By contrast, the 2005 Act seems to
have as subject-matter actionable claims and litigants of national
origin.
2.5 Conclusion
Human rights litigation in the US has produced encouraging examples
of successful adjudication271 and has contributed to further legal
development that might serve as the legal basis for a new
international instrument on individual civil liability for human rights
atrocities. The US human rights adjudication breaks away from the
traditional (albeit challenged) view that claims based on violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law can only be made at
inter-state level272 and that these claims do not provide the individual
victim with enforceable financial remedies.273 The successes are
dampened, however, by the fact that most of these judgments were
not enforced, with the exception of some settlements in corporate
actions such as the Holocaust case and, more recently, the Unocal
case.274 The reality of poor enforcement has to be addressed soon for
US human rights litigation to powerfully deter human rights violations.
Time will eventually tell whether ATCA will maintain its influence
or whether its critics and political opponents will be successful in
their attempts to limit the scope of US human rights litigation and
silence a crucial legal tool for achieving international compliance with
human rights and international humanitarian law. Considering the
post-9/11 foreign and security policy of the (present) Bush
administration, with its ongoing ‘war against terror’ which has led to
direct US violations of international, international human rights and
humanitarian law, and the harnessing of services of allies with often
271 Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 239-245.
272 See BGH – III ZR 245/98 (OLG Köln) concerning claims of Greek citizens whose
relatives were murdered by German security forces in 1944. The German BGH as
the highest German court for civil and criminal matters, ruled in its 2003 Distomo
judgment that claims for human rights violations committed in WW II as violations
of international humanitarian law could only be raised at interstate level. For a
more detailed summary of the German legal situation, see below under 3.3. 
273 See above under ch 1.3.1 for an account of the individual human rights claimant
and his or her position in terms of the international legal situation. 
274 Report of the International Law Association Human Rights Committee (n 120
above) 130 fn 5.
40    Part Adoubtful human rights records, the prospect of US human rights
adjudication of a limited scope seems realistic.275
3 Civil liability for human rights atrocities in 
domestic legal systems, apart from the US
3.1  South Africa and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission276
The newly democratic, post-apartheid South Africa of 1994
committed itself as early as 1995 to redress the injustice and suffering
of the victims of apartheid and the victims of the anti-apartheid
struggle without establishing a quasi state liability for the new state.
Subsequently the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was
established in 1995 to investigate the nature, causes and extent of the
violations committed by all parties involved in the conflict.277
Reparations for gross human rights violations committed in South
Africa during the apartheid-era conflict were originally intended to
result from an intense reconciliation and nation-healing process,
which combined the elements of confession by perpetrators with
absolution by victims and their relatives.
The TRC followed the legal view that apartheid was a crime
against humanity278 and recognised that the liberation movements
conducted a legitimate armed struggle against the former South
African government. With reference to the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols, the Commission distinguished between a ‘just war’ and the
question of ‘just means’ and concluded that, in the course of the
conflict, the ANC contravened humanitarian law principles and was
275 Sebok does not exclude future claims against the US government pertaining to
torture incidents in Abu Ghraib. See ‘Could suits against the US government by
Iraqis subject to abuse in Abu Ghraib prison succeed?’ http://writ.findlaw.com/
sebok/20050221.html. The US academic and columnist Fletcher found as early as
2002 that there could be a realistic possibility of holding President Bush civilly
liable for the attack on Iraq, see ‘If the president orders an attack on Iraq without
Security Council approval, can injured Iraqis sue the president in US courts?’
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20020925_fletcher.html.
276 I want to thank my LL.D supervisor, Professor Strydom of the University of
Johannesburg, for his insightful help on the TRC and its role in post-apartheid
South Africa. His help has enabled me to reflect on the South African situation.
277 See post-amble of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act and
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1993.
278 Interesting in this context is the finding of US Sprizzo J in re South African
Apartheid Litigation (n 130 above) that the Apartheid Convention of 1973 (1015
UNTS 243, 245) was not binding international law at that time due to the fact that
the major states of the US, UK, Germany, France, Canada and Japan had not
ratified this Convention at that time. This finding led to the dismissal of the
Apartheid lawsuit on the ground of a lack of ATCA-based jurisdiction of US federal
courts.
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morally and politically accountable.279
The TRC’s second objective was to secure the payment of
reparations to individual victims or their relatives. This reparation
procedure deliberately avoided a ‘victors’ justice’ approach by
establishing a state-run reparation scheme for the compensation of as
many as 22 000 victims. The TRC recommended in 1998 the setting
aside of R2.8 billion for the payment of final reparations to the
acknowledged victims of apartheid.280 This contribution to justice
and humanity by financially redressing suffering has been severely
hampered by the South African government’s inability, and even
unwillingness, to make the promised reparation payments. Initial
disbursements of R48.37 million has been made by the Nelson
Mandela’s President’s Fund and paid out in November 2001 in grants
of R3 000 to the 17 100 applicants. Further payments and a
finalisation of reparations still await the government’s
implementation. This unfortunate situation has already raised
international concern, as the following statement of Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International illustrates: 281
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are concerned that
there has been no systematic effort to ensure that the TRC’s
recommendations are implemented. In particular, the government has
failed to ensure that the modest reparations proposed by the TRC for
victims are paid. The participation in the TRC process of victims of
human rights abuses was critical for the integrity and credibility of this
experiment in addressing past human rights violations. In addition to the
moral obligation to victims implicitly arising from the agreement to
grant amnesty to perpetrators that arose from the political transition,
there are clear international obligations for states to provide
reparations, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, for
victims of gross violations of human rights. Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International urge the South African government to live up to
the standards which are embodied in these human rights treaties which
it has ratified.
This unfortunate situation needs the urgent attention of the SA
government, especially since President Mbeki uses the TRC and its
(intended) reparation policy as justification for his support of the
corporate defendants in the ongoing in re South African Apartheid
Litigation,282 thus creating outrage and disillusionment among the
domestic human rights community and apartheid victims. 
279 (2003) Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report vol 6 642-643.
280 Using the benchmark of R21 700 – the median annual household income in South
Africa at the time.
281 See joint statement by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (February
2003) ‘Truth and justice: unfinished business in South Africa’ 7 www.hrw.org/
backgrounder/africa/truthandjustice.pdf.
282 n 130 above; see for the present stance of the SA government (n 264 above).
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The jurisprudence of the UK provides international law with
important precedents in respect of the principle of state immunity
and its exceptions. In the Pinochet No 3 decision,283 the House of
Lords denied Pinochet, as former head of state, immunity rationae
materiae on the grounds that torture had become a jus cogens crime
of international law.284 
Interestingly, other English courts thwarted civil actions against
states or state officials by using the State Immunity Act of 1978 in the
past.285 In Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait,286 the court initially
allowed leave to serve summons outside its jurisdiction to the
government of Kuwait and three individual defendants for claims of
psychological damage to a British-Kuwaiti plaintiff who allegedly
suffered torture in a Kuwaiti security prison. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal set aside the decision to serve and ruled that Kuwait was
entitled to state immunity under section 1(1) of the State Immunity
Act of 1978. This decision was taken on appeal to the ECtHR on the
grounds that the Court of Appeal’s decision infringed on the right to
a fair trial as stipulated in article 6 of the European Convention. The
ECtHR found with a majority of nine to eight that there had not been
such an infringement by the Court granting Kuwait state immunity287
because it had ‘pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate’.288
Considering the implications of the Al-Adsani case for human
rights litigation, it appeared as if the door to English courts had been
shut. However, in 2004, the Court of Appeal issued a decision, Jones
v Saudi Arabia,289 which partially overturned the Al-Adsani decision
in respect of individual defendants sued for acts of state torture.290
The plaintiff appealed an a-priori court’s decision to strike out his
claims291 against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as first defendant and
a lieutenant colonel Aziz as a servant or agent of the Kingdom as
second defendant on the grounds of section 1 of the State Immunity
Act 1978. The Court of Appeals upheld the appeal against Aziz as an
283 R v Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No 3) 2000 1 AC 147.
284 As above 205, 248.
285 See Report of the International Law Association Human Rights Committee (n 120
above) 150-158.
286 (1995) 100 International Law Reports 465. 
287 Al-Adsani v UK in (2002) 34 European Human Rights Reports 11 paras 46-49.
288 As above par 50.
289 Ronald Grant Jones v The Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya as
Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) & Anor in [2004] EWCA Civil 1394, Jones v
Saudi Arabia hereafter. 
290 In Jones v Saudi Arabia the plaintiff, Jones, was allegedly tortured and falsely
imprisoned in 2001 by the Saudi Ministry of the Interior and its agents. 
291 Claim No HQ020X01805. The Court combined Jones’ claim with claim No
HQ04X00431 brought by three other claimants against four Saudi individuals for
similar allegations of torture committed by Saudi officials.
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application of sovereign immunity and remitted the application for
further consideration.292 The Court thereby focused on recent
jurisprudence on the matter of criminal and civil immunity for
individual perpetrators of international crimes and found no grounds
for granting immunity to the individual defendant.293
With this ruling, access to English courts for actions of human
rights litigation against individual defendants is possible in principle.
The Court’s judgment is remarkable because it breaks with prior
jurisprudence of the Crown’s courts in their upholding of the principle
of foreign states’ absolute immunity from suit.294 It is, however, too
early and probably even unrealistic to speak of the commencement of
US-style human rights litigation before English courts.295 Other pre-
requisites for a successful action before English courts include the
establishment of the presence of the defendant, alternatively the
limited permission of a service out of jurisdiction and the non-
existence of grounds for a stay of proceedings because of forum non
conveniens. 
3.3 The Federal Republic of Germany
The (West) German Republic accepted responsibility for the legacy of
mass human rights violations committed by its legal predecessor, the
Third Reich. Since 1949 it has paid nearly €50 billion as direct financial
compensation to Holocaust and related Nazi crimes’ victims and their
relatives and as direct financial aid to the state of Israel.296 This
compensation is made in terms of special domestic laws, such as the
Bundesentschädigungsgesetz (BEG)297 of 1953, and under bi-national
treaties such as the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany,
Israel and the Jewish Claims Conference, the so-called Israel
Treaty.298 The original aim of payments was to compensate the
‘main’ victims of Nazi prosecution for their suffering in concentration
and extermination camps to which they were relegated because of
their Jewish ethnicity. Initially, financial compensation was not
292 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 289 above), paras 98-99.
293 As above, paras 54-68.
294 See Voyiakis ‘Access to court v state immunity’ in (2003) 52 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 297-332 for an overview of the recent practice in UK
courts and the subsequent confirmation of this jurisprudence by the ECtHR. 
295 n 292 above, 97, where Mance LJ predicts, that English courts won’t become the
forum of prime choice for future torture civil litigation because of specific
requirements to initiate proceedings under English common law. 
296 The total sum is expected to reach approximately €60 billion. Source: German
federal government retrievable at http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/
archives/backgrounds/ns_crimes.html.
297 Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution
of 1956.
298 Israel Vertrag.
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workers’.299 The BEG explicitly bars this group from receiving
compensation. In the Londoner Schuldenabkommen300 of 1953 the
question concerning compensation of slave workers was postponed
until the signing of a peace treaty.301 Germany’s responsibility for
war crimes and other breaches of humanitarian law has been
acknowledged by the German government in various multinational
peace treaties. The 1999 Holocaust Slave Labour settlement302
between the German federal government, the US government and
victims’ organisations led to the establishment of a DM 10 billion
compensation trust — the most recent testament of German
accountability for its Nazi past. This state responsibility does not,
however, invoke an individual’s right to redress against the German
state. Only the victim’s home state is entitled to redress.
Three recent court decisions support this claim. The 1996
Arbeitsentgelt für NS-Zwangsarbeiter decision303 of the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht304 on the individual enforceability of
claims305 for the remuneration for Nazi slave labourers outlines the
present view in respect of individual claims and state responsibility.
The Court found that, firstly, an individual is not an individual claim
holder vis-à-vis other states and, secondly, that claims based on war
acts are subject to international state peace treaties that do not
exclude parallel individual claims of victims against their own states.
This opinion of the Court finds support in the above-mentioned US
Princz,306 decision of 1994, which found that Germany’s state
sovereignty barred any direct legal action against it. The issue of com-
299 This term refers to the millions of people who were forced to work in the German
armament industry during the war. In 2001 it was estimated that there were still
around 1.5 million of these former slave workers alive. Stiftung (Trust)
‘Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft’ cit in Aktuell 2003 203.
300 The London Debt Agreement, in which questions concerning the German war debt
were settled. This term must not be confused with the 1943 London Agreement
that established the UN War Crimes Commission. See Jørgenson The responsibility
of states for international crimes (2003) 17.
301 It took nearly 40 more years before this peace treaty was signed. The two German
states and the four former allied victors signed in 1990 the ‘2 plus 4’ treaty which
paved the way for the German reunification and resembles a de facto peace
treaty.
302 This settlement, which does not resemble a settlement in legal terms, was meant
to end all pending lawsuits brought against German corporations before US
federal courts. See para 2.4.5 above and Sebok ‘Unsettling the Holocaust’ (n 246
above).
303 BVerfG Beschl v 13 5 1996-2 BvL 33/93 (1996) Neue Juristische Woche 2717-2720.
304 The German Constitutional Court (BVerfG).
305 The claim was based on the fact that in WW II German industry had used Jewish
and nationals of other countries as slave workers in factories. 
306 Princz v Federal Republic of Germany (n 151 above).
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in 1999 in the Holocaust slave labour307 settlement between the
German federal government,308 the US administration and victims’
organisations309 led to the establishment of a compensation trust.
The agreed amount was DM 10 billion and was to be equally funded by
the German federal government and a German corporate consortium. 
The 2003 Distomo decision310 of the German Bundesgerichtshof311
rejected financial claims against the Federal Republic of Germany
brought by relatives of Greek victims of 1944 war crimes. The Court
found that the claims lacked any legal basis in international and
domestic German law, and further, that prior Greek judgments,312
which had granted financial relief to the plaintiffs against the German
state as defendant, were contrary to the international principle of
state immunity from foreign civil judgments. The official liability of
the German state as the legal successor of the Third Reich for these
war crimes was rejected on the grounds that breaches of
humanitarian law did not fall under provisions on state liability and,
as such, could only be subject to individual accountability and
responsibility under international law provisions, which would rule
out individual claims against the responsible state. The view
according to which direct individual claims for breaches of
humanitarian law against states are non-justiciable under
international law,313 served as basis for the 2003 Varvarin ruling314 of
307 This settlement, which does not resemble a legal settlement in strictu sensu, was
meant to end all pending lawsuits brought against German corporations before US
federal courts. For a summary of the ‘Holocaust’ case with an evaluation of its
legal and political background, see Sebok ‘Un-settling the Holocaust’ (n 246
above).
308 Acting on behalf of German and — to a smaller extent — US corporations.
309 eg the Jewish Claims Conference.
310 BGH Urt v 26.6.2003-III ZR 245/98 (OLG Köln) in (2003) Neue Juristische Woche
3488-3493.
311 The German Supreme Court for Criminal and Civil Matters, ‘BGH’. 
312 District Court of Livadeia, Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany
case no 137/1997 judgment of 30 October 1997 and the subsequent confirmation
of the judgment by the Greek Areopag (ie Areios Pagos, the Greek Supreme
Court) on 4 May 2000 case no 11/2000 reprinted in (2001) 95 American Journal of
International Law 198. Compare in this context the Italian Court of Cassation’s
ruling of 11 March 2004 in the case Ferrini v Germany (Cass Sez Un 5044/04)
discussed in (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law   242-248. The
Italian Court of Cassation (Court of Appeal) found that Germany was not immune
from civil law suits for damages from deportation and forced labour during WW II
as jus cogens violations.
313 The Court explicitly recognises the recent developments in international law
where individual claims are actionable under various international human rights
instruments, eg art 2 (5) of the European Convention.
314 LG Bonn Urt v 10 12 2003 — 1 O 361/02 (nicht rechtskräftig) in (2004) Neue
Juristische Woche 525-526. The case concerned a civil action brought by a group
of 35 Serbian citizens in connection with the NATO war against the former
Yugoslavia in 1999. On 30 May 1999, ten civilians were killed in an aerial
bombardment of the bridge in the town of Vavarin, Yugoslavia, an incident which
was labeled later as ‘collateral damages’. 
46    Part Athe Landgericht Bonn315 concerning claims by victims of the 1999
NATO bombing campaign against the Republic of Serbia and
Montenegro. The court further denied the applicability of the
principle of official liability for Germany’s participation in the war on
the ground that acts of war are excluded because they constitute a
state of emergency in international law. The outcome of these cases
documents the extent of differences in domestic jurisprudence: On
the one hand the view exists that jus cogens violations of
international law can overcome jurisdictional immunities and, on the
other, the view prevails that states are still immune from civil suits
by individual plaintiffs and victims.
315 Regional High Court of Bonn (LG Bonn).
Chapter 3
Human rights litigation as a future deterrent
for the commission of future human rights
atrocities - the balance sheet
The preceding chapter gave a short overview of developments in
human rights civil litigation as an additional means of human rights
protection. It can be argued that only the ATCA adjudication in the US
could constitute a possible alternative means of human rights
protection. In the global arena international human rights and
humanitarian law provide only inadequately for civil liability. None of
the existing provisions allows for an actionable claim by the individual
rights bearer adjudicated by an independent civil claims forum.
Consequently, this chapter summarises some arguments in favour of
developing civil responsibility for human rights atrocities and its
subsequent adjudication before civil courts.  
1 Jus cogens violations as part of domestic torts law
The nature of breaches of customary international humanitarian and
human rights law, which resembles torts in common-law and civil-law
jurisdictions alike, leads to the conclusion that domestic jurisdictions
may eventually recognise such violations as actionable torts under
their respective domestic laws applying the principles of the law of
conflict within the ambit of private international law.316 With the
exception of the US’ ATCA adjudication, this possibility is not
recognised in any domestic jurisdiction explicitly yet.317 Assuming a
future general understanding of the justiciability of such civil actions
in accordance with tort principles under private international law, the
316 Stipulating that the law of the forum state applies unless foreign law was chosen
by one of the parties. The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
of 1995 applies in s 11(1) the general rule for tort actions before English courts
whereas the applicable law is the law of the country where the tort occurred.
317 See Report of the International Law Association Human Rights Committee (n 120
above) ‘Section V – The Applicable Law of Tort’ 158 et seq with a theoretical
evaluation of possible tortious human rights actions.47
48    Part Afollowing section will outline the advantages of such a supplementary
legal instrument.
2 The advantage of civil remedies in protecting 
human rights
There are two particular aspects of civil liability coupled with
financial remedies for human rights atrocities which make this form
of accountability especially rewarding. Civil remedies serve the
purpose of ‘relieving the suffering of and affording justice to victims
by removing or redressing to the extent possible the consequences of
the wrongful acts […] [r]eparation should respond to the needs and
the wishes of the victim’.318 Financial redress acknowledges the
victim’s suffering and may facilitate rehabilitation and present the
victim with closure to a traumatic incident.319 Secondly, civil
remedies, especially of a high monetary value, could deter possible
offenders because of personal financial implications. Granting
punitive damages320 in US ATCA actions punishes and deters at the
same time. Because the verdict directly affects the private assets of
offenders, civil liability will hurt most contemporary human rights
offenders, whose private fortunes are spread across the world. As a
consequence, civil liability could possibly become a deterrent more
powerful than criminal prosecution would ever be.
3 The benefits of human rights litigation
Criminal proceedings under domestic and international jurisdictions
always require the will to actually prosecute. It is seldom up to the
victim alone to instigate such proceedings321 and to initiate events
that will lead to a court hearing. Political reasons, such as diplomatic
restraints, amnesty laws and plain unwillingness and inability of
respective judicial forums to prosecute, limit victims in their pursuit
of justice. In civil human rights litigation the victim has a more active
role in establishing accountability.322 The victim does not have to
wait for justice to take its slow course through lengthy criminal
procedures before the ICC or a similar forum. The position of the
victim seeking justice is improved by active participation. A further
consequence of such a private action would be that the existence of
318 Fernandez ‘Reparations policy in South Africa for the victims of apartheid’ (1999)
3 Law, Democracy and Development 210.
319 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 289 above) par 80.
320 Punitive damages in US civil law are damages which are granted in addition to the
individual damages for the victim’s loss or harm. This class of damages sets out to
punish the defendant for his or her actions.
321 See Introduction above on such obstacles for criminal prosecution.
322 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 289 above) par 80.
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would be brought to a wider international audience leading to more
accurate accounts of atrocities. This is of great importance in cases
involving MNCs, since they depend on a good corporate image and
therefore fear bad publicity even more than individuals do.323 Some
commentators hold that civil suits may be more effective than
criminal prosecution to establish the full facts of violations.324
Standards of proof, higher than those of civil law actions, and
difficulties in gathering evidence apply to criminal proceedings to the
detriment of ascertaining all facts.325 Another advantage of civil
proceedings is that the presence of the defendant in court is
unnecessary326 and obtaining a default judgment is possible.327
It is worth remembering the advantage of a civil liability action to
transitional justice: The financial compensation of the victim
recognises suffering and by doing so restores honour and dignity to the
victim. Such an acknowledgment enables a government to grant
amnesty for human rights violations committed during a previous
regime and could therefore reconcile a torn community.328 Civil
liability can be a tool of reconciliation when public policy and the
national interest demand amnesty329 and victims’ rights are not
denied.330
Civil liability can overcome some of the main obstacles to
effective criminal prosecution. In the case of immunity for acts
committed by individuals in official capacity,331 this protection could
be pierced. The practice of civil courts on the domestic level is,
however, not coherent and far from resembling a consuetudo.332
Considering that the recent ‘Draft United Nations Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property’333 practically
exempts the property of a state from the jurisdiction of other states’
323 See 2.4.4. on corporate lawsuits.
324 Jose E Alvarez ‘Lessons of the Tadic judgment’ (1998) 96 Michigan Law Review
203.
325 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 289 above) par 80.
326 As above par 81.
327 See Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 174-178 about the use of default judgments
in US human rights litigation under ATCA. 
328 Such as the Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Rwanda.
329 Such amnesty, however, can, in respect of the ICC Statute, only be granted in
cases which do not resemble core crimes in the sense of art 5(1) lit a-d.
330 Another example of using the means of civil liability as a corrective for suffering
can be found in the Islamic law of Shari’a where in the case of murder the head of
the family clan has got the right to accept a sum of money for his dead kin and by
doing so spare the offender from prosecution and eventual execution.
331 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 289 above) par 98 where the Court rejected the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia’s blanket claim to state immunity for individual defendants.
332 See Dugard ‘Immunity, human rights and international crimes’ (2005) 3 Tydskrif
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 482-489 on the present restrictive court practice in civil
proceedings.
333 UN Doc A/59/22.
50    Part Acourts,334 civil remedies against individual perpetrators could be the
only feasible way to claim financial damages for human rights
atrocities.
Conclusion Part A
This part offered an introduction to and overview of existing means of
establishing the accountability of individuals and corporations for
their participation in human rights atrocities. In conclusion, it must be
stated that at present only US human rights litigation, is able to
establish some form of civil accountability on a universal level (albeit
limited). 
The impressive record of nearly 100 human rights litigation cases
before US federal courts, to date, hardly finds reflection in other
domestic law systems. So far there has not been one case outside the
US with a legacy comparable to Filartiga. This lack of a uniform state
practice prevents human rights litigation from becoming part of
customary international law and thus impedes the further
development of a universal civil jurisdiction of domestic courts.335
Nonetheless, civil actions in US human rights litigation have
contributed to the development of international law in domestic
courts of other states. One example is English courts quoting ATCA
adjudication as legal precedent.336
All other systems and means available under international and
domestic law that are suitable to establish civil liability for human
rights atrocities remain in an underdeveloped state, go unapplied or
is not enforced. But even the advanced US system has shortcomings
and limitations which hamper its use as a universal deterrent. These
findings document the need for an international approach on civil
liability of individuals and corporations for human rights atrocities as
a supplement to existing means of international criminal and human
rights law.
334 Art 5 stipulates that ‘[a] State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its
property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the
provisions of the present Convention’.
335 See Rau ‘Domestic adjudication of international human rights abuses and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens’ in (2001) 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht ZaöRV 177, 194.
336 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 289 above) paras 61-68. 
Part B
Draft statute on a convention on individual
civil liability for human rights atrocities
Introduction and overview 
This part outlines and comments on the various elements and aspects
of a proposed  convention on individual civil liability. Each provision
is evaluated in the context of already existing legal instruments,
jurisprudence and, where applicable, examples of customary usage. 
The draft’s overall aim is the establishment of a workable system
on civil liability of the individual and corporate perpetrator for a
specified selection of egregious human rights atrocities. The
envisaged regime of civil responsibility foresees the imposition of
heavy financial penalties for a convicted perpetrator. In this regard
the draft follows the precedents and examples of US human rights
litigation under ATCA and subsequent human rights litigation
legislation. 51
52    Part BArticle 1
The Court
An International Court of Human Rights Litigation (the Court) is
hereby established as a separate chamber to the International Court
of Justice. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over natural and legal persons for
the most serious violations of human rights, as referred to in this
Statute, and shall be complementary to national civil jurisdictions.
The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the
provisions of this Statute. 
Commentary
The new Court will be established as an additional but separate
chamber to the ICJ. Its jurisdiction,338 organs339 and procedure follow
the working procedures of forums of criminal justice such as the ICC,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the SCSL. Breaches of customary international humanitarian and
human rights law will constitute ‘international crimes’340 and tortious
behaviour,341 This could result in civil liability under the prescriptions
of the law of tort or delict in international and domestic law.342
Consequently, the link between individual civil liability for serious
breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law and
individual criminal responsibility343 for the same type of offences
implies a court structure and organisation that follow the example of
criminal adjudication. It therefore seems logical to establish the
338 The Court has jurisdiction over international torts arising from serious breaches of
international human rights and humanitarian law. 
339 The office of the Trial Advocate, established by art 4(b) of the draft, illustrates
the similarity between the proposed Court’s organs and that of a criminal court.
The Trial Advocate’s role is part prosecutor and part legal council to the victim-
plaintiff. The Trial Advocate’s investigative rights in regard to discovery and fact
finding are similar to that of a criminal prosecutor.  
340 n 31 above.
341 The draft articles of the ILC on responsibility of states for internationally
wrongful acts do not recognise ‘any distinction between State “crimes”  and
“delicts”’. See ‘Commentaries to the draft articles on responsibility of states for
internationally wrongful acts’ (n 47 above).
342 See above part A for the present legal situation regarding civil liability for human
rights violations. Note that the present situation generally still does not recognise
the individual victim, with the exception of US human rights litigation, which
views the individual victim as a claim holder against a perpetrating state.
343 The law of international delict and international criminal law have interrelated
features: Since the Chorzow Factory case it is an acknowledged principle in
international law that breaches of international law and the responsibility of
states resemble international delicts with a duty to compensate. See Shelton
‘Righting wrongs: reparations in the articles on state responsibility’ (2002) 96
American Journal of International Law 833. Bassiouni describes reparations as ‘a
hybrid between criminal penalty and civil damages’ and thereby explains the
interrelation between criminal and delictual law. Cited in Laplante (n 116 above)
382.
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supplement its remedies with civil liability. However, considering the
temporary nature of jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, the only
suitable forum for such a supplementing body would be the ICC as a
permanent court. The Court, as a separate chamber to the ICC would
then be responsible for  adjudication on reparations for victims, which
is pre-emptively addressed in article 75 of the ICC Statute.344  
This draft opts for a fresh approach by establishing a new
International Court of Human Rights Litigation that will form an
independent and separate chamber annexed to the ICJ and not to the
ICC.345 This is mainly based on two considerations.  Firstly, the ICJ346
as the UN’s principal judicial body has for 60 years contributed
significantly to the goal of achieving international justice and comity,
and of defining international legal standards.347 Secondly, choosing
the ICJ as the main forum acknowledges that the ICJ has already
provided international law with a sufficient corpus of jurisprudence
on jus cogens and other grave human rights violations and on the civil
liability of an offending state in the form of reparations.348 In
addition, the ICC would be the wrong forum to choose given that its
existence as a judicial organ is seriously threatened by the persistent
US opposition to the ICC.349 The fact that the US has over the last 25
years become familiar with civil human rights adjudication under
ATCA and that this form of recourse was recently reaffirmed in
principle by the US Supreme Court,350 suggest that the US will be
more supportive of the International Court of Human Rights Litigation
in the form proposed here.
344 Art 75 of the ICC Statute imposes on the ICC the obligation to develop principles
for reparations for victims.
345 Given that the ICC seems like the more suitable forum given the above-stated
considerations.
346 And to a lesser extent its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International
Justice.
347 Even the fact that some UN members sometimes disregard the ICJ’s authority in
contentious and advisory procedures does not devaluate the ICJ’s role as the
world’s primary judiciary organ. These actions are very often ideologically
motivated and resemble actual policy trends but they do not prevent the
development of a body of new international jurisprudence based on the findings
of the ICJ. See eg the Nicaragua case and the opposition of the US to ICJ
proceedings (n 39-40 above). 
348 See part A ch 1 above on state responsibility with legal authorities.
349 The US, after a short period of initial support for the ICC under the Clinton
administration, has become the fiercest opponent of the Court. A prominent
example of the US’s policy of opposition and obstruction towards the ICC is the US
American Service members’ Protection Act (ASPA) of August 2002 Pub L No 107-
206 §§ 2001-2015 116 Stat 820 (2002). ASPA authorises the president of the US to
use all necessary and appropriate (even military) means to free US or allied
personnel detained by or on behalf of the ICC.
350 Sosa (n 137 above) where the Supreme Court basically reconfirmed the role of
future ATCA litigation.
54    Part BThe complementary nature of the Court confirms the primacy of
civil proceedings in the domestic jurisdictions of the member states.
The draft therefore acknowledges the principle of state sovereignty
in respect of civil jurisdiction and follows the example of the ICC with
its jurisdiction being merely complementary in nature to the
jurisdiction of domestic criminal courts.351
Article 2
Relationship of the Court with the United Nations
The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations
through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States
Parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of
the Court on its behalf. 
Article 3
Seat of the Court
1. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the
Netherlands (the host state) as a separate chamber to the
International Court of Justice. 
2. The Court shall enter into a headquarters agreement with the
host state, to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties and
thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf. 
Article4
Organisation of the Court
The Court shall consist of the following organs:
(a) the Chambers, comprising one or more Trial Chambers and an
Appeals Chamber; 
(b) the Trial Advocate; and 
(c) the Registry.
Commentary
One of the novelties of the draft Statute is the establishment of the
Trial Advocate as an independent organ of the Court. This office
combines the duties of a victim-plaintiff’s counsel with those of a
prosecutor in criminal matters, which is necessary here because the
subject matter bears close resemblance to criminal proceedings. This
351 See arts 1 and 17 of the Rome Statute.
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respect of discovery of documents and fact-finding missions in situ.352
The Trial Advocate’s further role is that of main counsel for the
victim-plaintiff and is comparable to an impartial pro bono attorney
who ensures that actions brought before the Court are based on strong
legal and factual grounds and are not brought for the sole benefit of
the ‘billing lawyer’. Recent US case law documents the unfortunate
trend of the ‘billing lawyer’ and shows how US legislation is trying to
stifle this phenomenon.353 The creation of the Trial Advocate as an
independent plaintiff counsel could be a possible solution to these
negative developments. The proposal for the creation of an
independent defence unit for proceedings before the two ad hoc
criminal tribunals,354 which was made during a 2001 symposium on
developments in international criminal law, reflects growing
acceptance of the establishment of such institutionalised (semi-
organs of the Court.355
The Court has a structure partly adversarial, partly inquisitorial.
The draft combines the structural and procedural elements of
common-law adversarial trial proceedings with the inquisitorial
powers of judges in civil-law jurisdictions. The role of judges follows
common-law principle, limiting them to supervise fairness of the trial
and procedure as opposed to  more active participation in the trial
through their own, independent inquisitorial acts, as is the case in
(continental) civil-law jurisdictions.
In this regard the role of the Trial Advocate differs. He or she plays
an active role in the trial proceedings through investigations and fact-
finding missions and through the right to cross-examine witnesses.
The Trial Advocate’s active role in the proceedings coupled with
quasi-inquisitorial powers strengthen the position of the victim-
plaintiff in otherwise adversarial court proceedings. The concept of
the Trial Advocate will render additional victim empowerment rights
obsolete. A practical example of such an empowerment right would
be the inclusion of rules which explicitly shift the onus of proof to the
352 In the US ATCA case of Paul v Avril (1994) 901 F Supp 330 (S D Fla), the plaintiff’s
lawyer was murdered in Haiti while trying to gather evidence. See Stephens &
Ratner (n 137 above) 179. 
353 The newly enacted US Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 refers in sec 2(a)(3)(A) to
the present situation in state class actions where the legal counsel is awarded
high fees while the plaintiff is left with nothing or coupons of little value. The
unfortunate example of the Holocaust counsel, Ed Fagan, serves as justification
for limiting the rights of lawyers to start actions. He has even been accused of
breaching fiduciary duties regarding clients and faces disbarment, see ‘Schwere
Vorwürfe gegen Star-Awalt Fagan’ Der Spiegel Online 18 September 2005 at
http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,342396,00.html. See part A ch 2 for
more details. 
354 ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute.
355 See the authoritative report on international criminal law ‘Developments in the
law – international criminal law’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 1947-2071, 2005.
56    Part Bcorporate defendant, thus favouring the plaintiff. Such burden-
shifting finds its precedent in law governing domestic and
international product liability356 and effectively reduces the burden
on the plaintiff to prove the facts of the case. 
The Trial Advocate resembles a novum in procedural law,
incorporating elements of two sets of legal procedures. One example
of such a ‘mixed’ organ can be found in German criminal procedure
where the victims of serious crimes have the right to join personally
or through a counsel — in cases of mandatory representation — the
public prosecutor in the prosecution of these crimes. The victim and
his or her counsel’s investigative powers and other procedural rights
would be similar to those of the prosecutor.357 The investigative
judge of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) has a similar role.358 
Article 5
Composition of the Chambers
1. The Chambers shall be composed of not less than eight (8) or
more than eleven (11) independent judges, who shall serve as follows:
(a) Three judges shall serve in the Trial Chamber
(b) Five judges shall serve in the Appeals Chamber
2. Each judge shall serve only in the Chamber to which he or she
has been appointed.
3. The judges of the Appeals Chamber and the judges of the Trial
Chamber, respectively, shall elect a presiding judge who shall
conduct the proceedings in the Chamber to which he or she was
elected. The presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber shall be the
President of the Court.
4. If, at the request of the President of the Court, an alternate
judge or judges have been appointed by the Secretary-General, the
presiding judge of a Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber shall
356 Compare § 1(4) of the German Produkthaftungsgesetz (Product Liability Statute)
of 1989 in its amended form of 19 July 2002 BGBl I S 2198, which imposes the onus
of proof in regards to the non-faultiness of the product on the producer. Reasons
for the exclusion of liability for a faulty product are defined in subsecs 2 and 3 of
§ 1. 
357 §§ 395 et seq of the German Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozeßordnung, StPO)
gives the victim and his or her relatives the right to start a joint (criminal) action
incidental to criminal proceedings. The victim or his or her counsel (in cases of
mandatory representation) has procedural rights under § 397 StPO which are
similar to the rights of the prosecutor. The German legal texts can be retrieved
from http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/stpo.html.
358 See art 3 Zif a) lit 3 of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal of December 2003
of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) (2004) 43 International Legal
Materials 231.
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trial and to replace a judge if that judge is unable to continue sitting.
Article 6
Legal status and powers of the Court
1. The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also
have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the fulfilment of its aims. 
2. The Court shall make rules for carrying out its functions. In
particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure and evidence.
Commentary
The technical specifications of the Court’s relationship with the UN
and the host state follow the examples of the ICC and the two ad-hoc
tribunals.359 Paragraph 2 finds its corresponding provisions in the
wording of articles 30 of the ICJ Statute, 51 of the ICC Statute, 14 of
the ICTR Statute and 15 of the ICTY Statute.
Article 7 
The Trial Advocate
1. The Trial Advocate shall be responsible for the investigation of
the alleged offences after proceedings have been instituted before
the Court. The Trial Advocate shall act independently as a separate
organ of the Court. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions
from any government, party to trial proceedings or from any other
source.
2. The Trial Advocate has the authority to approve or disapprove of
the legal counsel chosen by the victim. The Trial Advocate’s decision
can be challenged before the Court. The Court’s decision is final.
3. The Trial Advocate shall have the power to question the parties
and witnesses, to collect and secure evidence and to conduct on-site
investigations. In carrying out these tasks, the Trial Advocate shall, as
appropriate, be assisted by the state authorities concerned.
4. The Trial Advocate shall be appointed by the Secretary-General
for a three-year term and shall be eligible for re-appointment. He or
she shall be of high moral character, possess the highest level of
professional competence, and have extensive experience in the
conduct of investigations and proceedings in civil and criminal cases.
359 See eg arts 2-4 of the ICC Statute.
58    Part B5. The Trial Advocate shall be assisted by a Deputy Trial Advocate,
and by court and such international staff as may be required to
perform the functions assigned to him or her effectively and
efficiently.
Commentary
The Trial Advocate’s power to approve or disapprove of the choice of
counsel made by the plaintiffs constitutes a necessary right in order
to enable the Trial Advocate to act as ‘guardian’ of the victim-
plaintiff’s interests. Consequently, the Trial Advocate’s actions have
to enjoy priority over other counsels’ actions. This selection power
applies only to the plaintiff’s choice of legal counsel. The defendant’s
choice of counsel remains unaffected by such limitations.
The Trial Advocate’s powers in respect of the investigation of
alleged tortious behaviour and  collecting necessary evidence are
regulated in the third paragraph. The Trial Advocate’s strong,
independent position as the primary organ for the investigation of
cases is safeguarded by the explicit obligation placed on member
states to support him or her in carrying out tasks. The direct
appointment of the Trial Advocate by the General Secretary, as
stipulated in the fourth paragraph, makes the position comparable to
that of an international prosecutor in criminal forums.360 These
provisions are necessary for the Trial Advocate to carry out  assigned
tasks with as little outside interference as possible.
Typical deficits and weaknesses of international litigation are
often encountered in the context of evidence and unearthing
documents: Judicial requests are often not honoured and local
authorities can even actively prevent successful evidence collection.
The position of the Trial Advocate as a quasi-prosecutorial organ of
the Court should protect his or her work from such  difficulties and
probable interference and enable him or her to work  in a manner as
effective as that of, for example,  the chief prosecutor of the ICTY
(and formerly the ICTR), Carla Del Ponte.361
360 Compare art 18 of the IST Statute which established the Tribunal Investigative
Judge. See ‘Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 48: Delegation of
Authority Regarding an Iraqi Tribunal’ CPA/ORD/9 Dec 2003/48 (2003). This order
became the IST Statute, reprinted in (2004) 43 International Legal Materials 231.
Iraq’s transitional National Assembly and the Iraqi transitional government
abolished the IST and its Statute in October 2005 by enacting Iraqi law no 10 of
November 2005. This Act essentially re-established the IST as the Supreme Iraqi
Criminal Tribunal (SICT) and serves as its Statute. Art 15 of the SCSL Statute of 16
January 2002. The Statute can be retrieved from http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
statute.html.
361 Carla Del Ponte’s nickname (the new Gestapo) is a measure of her success in
prosecuting war criminals of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. See ‘Profile:
Carla Del Ponte’ BBC News 28 August 2003 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/
1/hi/world/europe/1809185.stm. 
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The Registry
1. The Registry shall be responsible for the administration and
servicing of the Court.
2. The Registry shall consist of a Registrar and such other staff as
may be required.
3. The Registrar shall be appointed by the Secretary-General after
consultation with the President of the Court and shall be a staff
member of the United Nations. He or she shall serve for a three-year
term and be eligible for re-appointment.
4. The Registrar shall set up a Victim and Witnesses Unit within the
Registry. This Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office of the
Trial Advocate, protective measures and security arrangements,
counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses and victims
who appear before the Court and others who are at risk on account of
testimony given by such witnesses. The Unit’s personnel shall include
experts in trauma counselling, including trauma related to crimes of
sexual violence and violence against children.
Commentary
This Article follows the wording of article 16 of the SCSL and provides
in its fourth paragraph special protective measures for victims and
witnesses as already established in other procedures before
international criminal forums.362 What is important, however, is that,
unlike procedures in criminal matters, these protective measures only
get underway when the  trial procedures commence, thus taking into
account the nature of the court as being primarily a civil and not a
criminal forum. Without such differentiation, the procedures of the
court would become semi-prosecutorial in nature and scope and
eventually neglect the principle of party autonomy, which is a crucial
feature of civil proceedings and which applies here, albeit in a
reduced form. 
Article 9
The status, privileges and immunities of the Court
1. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations of 13 February 1946 shall apply to the Court, the judges, the
362 Art 16(4) of the SCSL Statute, art 43(6) of the ICC Statute, arts 21-22 of the ICTR
Statute and ICTY Statute.
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staff. 
2. The judges, the Trial Advocate and the Registrar shall enjoy the
privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to
diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law.
3. The staff of the Trial Advocate and of the Registrar shall enjoy
the privileges and immunities accorded to officials of the United
Nations under articles V and VII of the Convention referred to in
paragraph 1 of this article.
4. Other persons, including the parties, required at the seat of the
International Tribunal shall be accorded such treatment as is
necessary for the proper functioning of the International Tribunal.
Commentary
The provisions on status, privileges and immunities of the Court, its
organs and other persons (such as counsel and witnesses) required at
the seat of the Court follow the example of provisions applicable to
the ICJ and other international criminal tribunals.363 The Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February
1946 provides for strong protective rights for personnel of the UN.364 
Article 10
Independence of the Court
1. The members of the Court shall be independent in the
performance of their functions. 
2. No member shall engage in any activity which is likely to
interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their
independence.
3. No member of the Court, with the exception of the Trial
Advocate, may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case. 
4. No member of the Court with the exception of the Trial
Advocate, may participate in the decision of any case in which he or
she has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one
of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or
of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity. 
363 See arts 30 and 29 of ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute, art 48 ICC Statute and art 19
ICJ Statute.
364 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1 UNTS 15, 13
February 1946.
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shall be decided by an absolute majority of the judges. Where any
such question concerns an individual judge, that judge shall not take
part in the decision.
Commentary
Article 17 of the ICJ Statute and article 40 of the ICC Statute contain
similar provisions in respect of the independence of judges. The draft
follows the wording of these authoritative instruments because of
their conclusiveness and effectiveness, as demonstrated in the ICJ’s
decade-long jurisprudence.
Article 11
International torts within the jurisdiction of the Court
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious
breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law of
concern to the international community as a whole (‘international
human rights torts’). The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with
this Statute with respect to international human rights torts arising
out of the following gross violations of international law (‘crimes’):365
(a) the crime of genocide; 
(b) crimes against humanity; 
(c) war crimes; 
(d) the crime of torture;
(e) the crime of terrorism; and
(f) other systematic and gross violations of human rights.
365 The terminus international human rights torts refers, as stated in art 11, to the
‘most serious breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law of
concern’. It therefore constitute a symbiosis of humanitarian and human rights
law violations.  
62    Part BCommentary
The selection and wording of international torts that fall under the
jurisdiction of the Court, follow the prescriptions of international
criminal and human rights law and merge these fields of law. The
actionable torts mentioned find their corresponding provisions in
international criminal law where such offences would qualify as
so-called core crimes366 and as such would constitute ‘the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole’,367 or ‘serious international crimes’.368 This terminology
follows closely the definition in human rights law of ‘gross violations’
and evokes the grave character of offences, which constitute in their
intensity and impact a violation of the principles of international
law.369 The second paragraph of article 7 of the European Convention
qualifies these as acts that grossly violate the laws of civilised nations
and as behaviour that ‘when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations’.370 Common to this selection of serious breaches of
international human rights and humanitarian law is their status as jus
cogens norms of international public and criminal law.371 
The tort of ‘other systematic and gross violations of human rights’
under item (f) refers to tortious behaviour that does not constitute
‘international crimes’ strictu sensu because of not meeting the
threshold requirement of resembling a core crime or jus cogens of
international law. Instead it suggests human rights violations that,
although lacking the intensity and impact of a criminal act, do
nevertheless qualify as a jus cogens of international human rights law
as stipulated in internationally acknowledged human rights treaty
law.372 Such tortious behaviour can furthermore consist of any
systematic, serious and ongoing violation of certain rights contained
in the domestic constitution or laws of a state party to the Statute. 
366 See Murphy (n 31 above) 6.
367 As codified in art 5(1) of the ICC Statute and arts 16-18 and 20 of the 1996 ILC’s
draft code. Note that the crime of aggression, as the offence most recently
codified under international criminal law, still remains an undefined concept.
368 ‘Princeton principles on universal jurisdiction’ (2001) retrievable at http://
www1.umn.edu/humarts.instree/princeton.html (hereinafter, Princeton
principles) refers to this category of crimes as ‘serious crimes under international
law’ in principle 2(1) and adds to the four above-listed crimes piracy, slavery and
torture. See further Ratner & Abrams (n 29 above) 162 with additional sources.
369 See Commentaries on the ‘Draft articles on responsibility of states for
internationally wrongful acts’ (n 47 above) 285.
370 Art 7 II of the European Convention.
371 n 31 above.
372 As codified in international human rights instruments, eg ICCPR, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and aligned with the
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). An example
hereof is an individual act of racial discrimination by a state official, which itself
constitutes an internationally wrongful act even if it lacks the practice
requirement that would be clearly evident of such a wrongful behaviour.
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Personal jurisdiction
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural and legal persons
pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute. 
2. The status of a legal person is determined through the applicable
law as stipulated in article 20. The fact that a legal person is listed as
a corporate entity at a domestic or international stock exchange
serves as prima facie evidence of its legal personality.
3. The natural persons representing the legal person as directors or
in a similar leading role are separately and jointly liable for the
tortious acts committed by the legal person.
Commentary
Paragraph 1 establishes civil liability for the tortious behaviour of
natural and legal persons. The draft Statute acknowledges therefore
the accepted notion that corporations, as legal persons, are capable
of committing human rights atrocities and other international crimes
and should therefore be held accountable for criminal and tortious
behaviour of this nature.373 
The Statute’s regulations on corporate existence, organisation
and group structure of a legal person involved in proceedings before
the Court follow the regulations on corporate entities found in
international and domestic law. In this respect, domestic law refers
to the laws of state parties in whose jurisdiction the legal persons fall.
Unlike the victim’s right to choose the applicable domestic law — as
set out in the commentary to article 11 — the law on legal persons is
not subject to the victim-plaintiff’s discretion because of the wide
and diverging range of law applicable to juristic persons. Comparing
common-law and civil-law jurisdictions, significant differences in
respect of forms of corporate entities, the nature of their legal
personality and ways of formation are clear. The prima facie rule of
the second paragraph accounts for the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
an economically strong defendant, for example a corporation whose
assets can be attached in the proceedings. 
The liability rule in paragraph 3 ensures that the tortious conduct
of legal persons results in some form of accountability. The separate
liability rule should be invoked in cases where the civil liability of a
legal person cannot be established at all or when attachable assets do
not exist. Joint liability is an important feature when individuals use
373 See part A on the aspects of corporate civil liability with the US context.
64    Part Bthe corporate screen of a simple and informal corporate structure to
reduce their financial risk and shift risk to a legal person.374 
It is important to understand that the Court does not distinguish
between state and non-state actions in establishing individual
financial responsibility for committed acts. Legal difficulties with
regard to the applicable norms and their breaches, as seen in US
human rights litigation, therefore do not arise.375
Article 13 
Individual civil responsibility
1. A person or legal entity who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a international tort referred to in article
19 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for this
tort. A prior or simultaneous criminal conviction is not a precondition
for such liability.
2. The official position of any defendant, whether as head of state
or government or as a responsible government official or as director
of a legal entity shall not relieve such person of his or her civil
responsibility.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in article 11 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate or subsidiary entity
does not relieve his or her superior or the entity’s holding company of
civil responsibility if the superior or holding company knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate or subsidiary was about to
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts.
4. The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to an order of a
government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of civil
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of the later award
of damages if the Court determines that justice so requires.
374 The close corporation in SA law, given effect to by the Close Corporation Act 69 of
1984, is an example where a legal framework provides only basic rules for
corporate personality for small business enterprises without setting out financial
means and the scope of business activities. This situation can be found to a lesser
extent in the German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), which is
regulated in the GmbH Gesetz and bears close resemblance to the close
corporation entity.
375 See part A ch 2 on the complexity of adjudicating private, non-state actor
breaches of the ‘law of nations’ with reference to Kadic v Karadzic (1995) 70 F 3d
232 (2d Cir) and Doe v Unocal Corp (2000) 110 F Supp 2d 1294 (C D Cal) (NO CV 96-
6959 RSWL BQRX, CV 96-6112 RSWL BQRX) decisions of US federal courts.
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The Statute’s provisions on individual civil responsibility follow the
definition of criminal responsibility in the statutes of existing criminal
courts.376 Paragraph 1 confirms the autonomous nature of procedures
before the Court. The fact that the Court has civil jurisdiction over
tortious behaviour, which otherwise might qualify as criminal, might
prove instrumental in its jurisdiction being recognised by states that
are otherwise hostile towards criminal courts with universal
jurisdiction because of their fear of infringement of sovereignty of the
state or state organs.
Paragraphs 2 to 4 deals with possible defences in criminal
procedures that are not presently recognised under international
criminal law.377 By including these, the draft Statute is more
progressive in this regard than many domestic jurisdictions.378
Paragraph 3 imposes the principle of strict liability on defendants who
hold the power of command because of their position. This refers to
command structures in both classical military and security structures
and in the corporate world. The issue of strict liability is directly
linked to the mens reus element and the due diligence defence
applicable in criminal procedures. This strict liability principle
constitutes an evidential rule, which reverses the burden to the
defendant.379 
Article 14 
Applicable law
1. The Court shall apply in respect of the determination of the
elements of crimes as international torts: 
(a) the applicable treaties and conventions on the international law
of armed conflict and human rights law;
(b) domestic laws of the member states;
(c) international custom on the international law of armed conflict
and human rights law, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
376 See eg arts 6 and 7 ICTY Statute, art 25 ICC Statute.
377 See eg art 7 ICC Statute.
378 Part A ch 2.
379 In legal terms there is a distinction between legal and evidential burden of proof.
The former, also known as persuasive burden, places the burden to prove
innocence in criminal matters in toto on the accused while in terms of the latter,
the evidential burden is placed on the accused to introduce evidence in support
of his or her innocence. This leads to the obligation of the prosecution to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Considering this distinction and the civil trial
nature of proceedings before the court, burden of proof refers to the legal
burden of the defendant. See for a discussion of this aspect of strict liability
concerning corporate (criminal) behaviour, Pinto & Evans Corporate criminal
liability (2003) 168-170.
66    Part B(d) the general principles and rules of international law, including
the established principles of the international law of armed conflict
and human rights law; 
(e) judicial decisions and the teachings of highly regarded experts of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the
elements of crimes.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in
previous decisions of international judicial bodies. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article
must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights, and
be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as
gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other
status. 
Commentary
The Court has a wide discretion in its choice of applicable law under
article 14. In general, the structure follows article 38 of the ICJ
Statute with necessary amendments for the inclusion of a wide variety
of international torts. The primary source of law is the body of
international humanitarian and human rights law which is accepted as
the law of nations. The secondary source for judging an act as tortious
and actionable before the Court is the domestic laws of the member
state whose citizen has committed the tort or whose citizen is the
victim of such tortious behaviour. The victim has the privilege of
choosing the law. The other sources of law follow the definition of
applicable law as stipulated in article 38 of the ICJ Statute, providing
the court and the victim, assisted by the Trial Advocate, with a
further discretion concerning the law which is to be applied.
Paragraph 2 authorises the court to refer to its own jurisprudence
without establishing a stare decisis doctrine. Article 21(2) of the ICC
Statute gives the same discretion to that court. The choice and
applicability of law is limited through the ‘anti-discriminatory’ clause
in paragraph 3 which ensures that the same standards are always
applied in the application and choice of law.
Article 15
Statute of limitations
1. No actions for international torts under this statute shall be
asserted unless they are commenced within ten years after the
tortious act had been committed. 
2. This statute of limitation should be tolled during the time the
defendant was absent from the jurisdiction of this Court or incapable
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immunity in his or her home state from pursuing claims arising from
the same tortious acts against him or her before domestic courts shall
also exclude any period from being taken into consideration for
purposes of this article.
Commentary
The draft Statute imposes a time limit of ten years after the tort was
commissioned. Therein it follows the US TVPA,380 which contains in its
section 2(c) a ten-year statute of limitation. The German BGB, by
contrast, provides in its section 199(2) for a 30-year statute of
limitation for all claims arising from torts which involve violations of
life, integrity of the body, health or personal freedom.381
Due to the absence of a clause which explicitly limits the scope of
applicability of this statute to actions for torts committed only after
the entry of this draft Statute into force, the ten-year statute of
limitation creates the possibility of adjudicating human rights crimes
which had been committed long beforehand. Therefore, the question
of a possible violation of the non-retroactivity principle arises.
However, considering that all relevant international torts find their
legal basis or equivalent in already existing human rights and
humanitarian law instruments, the probability that this draft would
constitute ‘new’, albeit retroactive law, which could qualify as a
violation of the non-retroactivity principle,382 is negligible. This line
of argumentation finds its support in US federal jurisprudence, where
the US Supreme Court ruled in Landgraf v USI Film Products,383 that
newly enacted law may be applied to prior acts of conduct, when this
new law does not ‘impair rights a party possessed when […] acted,
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed’.384 Considering that the
nature of the civil liability for the commission of international torts
established under this statute does not lead to ‘new’ consequences
for the defendant, but to a comprehensive compilation of already
established and adjudicated forms of civil liability — as can be found
in international humanitarian, human rights and public law385 — this
Statute does not create a genuinely retroactive effect.386
380 28 U S C § 1331 Pub L No 102-256 106 Stat 73 (TVPA).
381 ‘Schadensersatzansprüche, die auf der Verletzung des Lebens, des Körpers, der
Gesundheit oder der Freiheit beruhen ...’. Translation by the author.
382 Also note that the threshold in civil proceedings is lower than that of criminal
proceedings.
383 (1994) 114 S Ct 1483.
384 As above 1505.
385 See part A on the different, already available forms of civil liability.
386 n 383 above, 1503.
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probable scenarios which could otherwise have jeopardised a future
action. A major one is non-accessibility of jurisdiction of the court for
the plaintiff as a ground for tolling. This could have the effect that
the plaintiff does not enjoy the necessary personal or factual freedom
to access the court for initiating a human rights action. The reasons
for this could be the existence of legal or factual reasons that deny
the plaintiff such rights. An example is the former Eastern European
slave labourers of the German Nazi holocaust, who were barred from
approaching US federal courts to initiate an ATCA action against
German defendants because of the East-West conflict. Their
‘permanent’ inability to access US courts lasted until 1991 with the
downfall of the Warsaw pact and amounted to a de facto absence of
possible plaintiffs from jurisdiction. The second tolling ground —
incapacity to start an action — refers to a variety of temporary
obstacles to approach the Court’s jurisdiction. Some examples are
imprisonment, severe or chronic illness of the victim-plaintiff and
other forms of incapacity which prohibit the plaintiff from proceeding
with the action. 
The immunity tolling acknowledges the new Court’s comple-
mentary nature387 in respect of domestic civil procedures before the
judicial forums of other member states. It accounts for the possibility
that initial proceedings before domestic courts could have failed
because the defendant invoked immunity from civil proceedings.388
The immunity tolling leaves the door open for eventual litigation
before the Court.
Article 16
Victims of violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law
1. A person is a ‘victim’ where, as a result of acts or omissions that
constitute an international human rights tort as defined under article
11, that person, individually or collectively, suffered harm, including
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering and economic loss. 
2. A ‘victim’ may also be a dependant or a member of the
immediate family or household of the direct victim as well as a person
who, in intervening to assist a victim or prevent the occurrence of
further violations, has suffered physical, mental, or economic harm. 
387 As formulated in art 1 of the Statute.
388 See in that respect the cases Al-Adsani v United Kingdom; Fogarty v United
Kingdom and McElhinney v Ireland, before the ECtHR in which the principle of
civil immunity of states was upheld; see part A ch 2.3.2.
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The definition of the term ‘victim’ follows the ‘Basic principles and
guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law’ as
adopted by the UNCHR in 2005.389 Paragraph 1 defines the individual
and collective victim status of an international human rights tort. The
definition of collective victim has particular practical relevance in
respect of class action proceedings as ATCA mass tort actions have
demonstrated.390 
The extension rule in paragraph 2 takes into account that other
categories of non-immediate victims shall be included in the victim
category in order to account for their (indirect) sufferings as well. The
last category of victims includes individuals who were victimised
because of their voluntary attempt to intervene or prevent these
crimes and accounts for forms of collateral damages. The notion that
a person who suffers damages because of courageous engagement for
the sake of third parties has a remedy is not totally new under
international and domestic law. The German civil code (BGB) grants a
general right to a remedy for a person who acts on behalf of a third
party without prior authorisation but with the intent to protect the
third party from imminent dangers.391
Article 17
Treatment of victims
1. Victims should be treated by the Court with compassion and
respect for their dignity and their human rights, and appropriate
measures should be taken by the Victims and Witnesses Unit after the
start of court procedures to ensure their safety and privacy as well as
that of their families. 
2. The Court shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for
the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in-camera
proceedings and the protection of the victim’s identity.
3. The Court should ensure that a victim who has suffered violence
or trauma should benefit from special consideration and care to avoid
389 UN Doc E/CN 4/2000/62. This draft was adopted by the UNCHR in 2005 as the
amended ‘Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation
for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious
violations of international humanitarian law’ UN Doc E/CN 4/RES/2005/35. See
part A ch 1 for an overview of the drafting process.
390 See part A ch 2 for a brief summary on the mass tort cases under the ATCA.
391 See §§ 683, 680, 677 BGB, the so called Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag.
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designed to provide justice and reparation. 
Commentary
With regards to the definition of a victim and prescribing his or her
treatment, the draft Statute follows recent developments in
international law.392 Both steps are important for the eventual legal
standing as a plaintiff or the option of asserting a class action.
Article 18
Locus standi
1. The individual victim or his or her relatives, represented through
their counsel as approved by the Trial Advocate, have the right to
start legal proceedings before the Court.
2. Minors lack an own standing before the Court. A minor is a person
under the age of 18 years. Proceedings can be instituted on their
behalf by a legal guardian. The Court can appoint a curator ad litem
to represent the minor. As an exception, the Court may grant a minor
who is approaching the age of majority the right to institute
proceedings without representation. 
3. Plaintiffs and defendants have the right to joinder of parties
when subject matter, parties and other particulars of the case give
rise to a direct and substantial interest. The Court can temporarily
abstain from adjudicating the matter in cases where a joinder is
opportune and the parties do not join. The Court will exclude such
parties from further proceedings after they have failed to comply with
its notice to join. The decision of the Court is final. 
4. Plaintiffs have the right to assert a class action with the Court
under the following preconditions:
(a) the sheer number of victims makes a joinder under paragraph 3
impossible;
(b) common questions of law and fact;
(c) typicality of claims and defences brought before the court; and 
(d) adequacy of class representation,
which enable the court to rule in toto. The final decision lies with the
Court. 
392 See eg art 22 of the ICTY Statute, paras 8 and 10 ECOSOC’s ‘Basic principles and
guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law’ E/CN 4/2000/62. 
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The mandatory representation through counsel is stipulated in article
19 below and discussed in the commentary on that article. The
standing of minors follows acknowledged principles of domestic
procedural law.393 Paragraph 2 sets the age for majority at 18 and
thus follows the rules on majority in most civil-law jurisdictions.394
Paragraph 3 allows the joinder of parties. It follows the principles
of common-law and civil-law jurisdictions on joinder of parties out of
necessity or convenience.395 In cases of a necessary joinder, the court
has the right and duty to exclude non-complying parties permanently
from further proceedings.396 The term ‘party’ refers only to a person
who has already been named as a party to the actual court
proceedings unlike the terminology in civil jurisprudence which
extends to a person beyond the scope of proceedings. The reason for
this limitation lies in the nature of the proceedings before the
International Court of Human Rights Litigation. It contains elements
of civil and criminal procedure. By following the rules of civil
procedure, every future party could block court proceedings passively
by not joining397 proceedings in progress. The limitation in the draft
Statute therefore serves the purpose of ruling out situations that
would lead to the cessation of the Court’s work. 
Paragraph 4 is of particular importance because it opens the way
to class action lawsuits resembling the US example of mass tort
actions under rule 23(a) of the Federal rules of civil procedure (as
amended in 1966).398 This procedural device permits the asserting of
393 See s 1 of the SA Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972, read with the Guardianship Act
192 of 1993. South Africa followed this international trend and lowered the age of
majority from 21 to 18 years of age. See section 17 of Children’s Act 63 of 2005.
On the topic of appointing a curator, see Van der Merwe v Die Meester,
Hooggeregshof & Andere 1966 1 SA 301 (SWA) at 303E-H. See Ex parte Goldman
1960 1 SA 8 (D) on the possibility of a court granting a minor the right to instigate
proceedings. Whilst in many common-law countries the age barrier for legal and
procedural capacity is set at 21, civil law jurisdictions follow the rule that 18
years are sufficient for reaching legal maturity.
394 See eg §§ 25 et seq of the German ZPO on the locus standi of minors. The general
rule in civil-law jurisdictions is that the minor possesses legal standing in court
procedures to the extent that he or she possesses unlimited legal capacity, which
sets the age of majority at 18.
395 See rules 10 and 12 of s 27 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 and §§ 50 et seq
ZPO of Germany which knows a similar distinction between necessary and
convenient joinder.
396 See on the topic of necessary joinder the SA case Hartland Implemente (Edms)
Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK & Andere 2002 3 SA 653 (NC).
397 Compare the consequences of rule 12 of s 27 of the Supreme Court Act where a
party does not join and the court does not adjudicate the matter further.
398 Fed R Civ P 23 (amended in 1966) of the US.
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paragraph 4 follows that of rule 23(a). The further prerequisites for
asserting a class action as a ‘mandatory’ procedure as stipulated in US
procedural law under rule 23(b) ought not to apply. The admissibility
of such action remains within the sole discretion of the Court.
Under US law and jurisprudence, class actions have been
successfully used in legal actions against the corporate world in health
hazard tort actions and race discrimination labour actions.400 The
severe legal consequences of such mass actions for the defendant
facing thousands of individual claims through one single lawsuit are
obvious. Consequently, mass torts have been frequently used in
human rights litigation before US federal courts with their impact best
documented in enormous settlements of Holocaust I and II.401 Reasons
for the power of a mass action are its direct financial impact on the
defendant with further implications pertaining to public observers.
Especially in the case of corporate defendants mass tort actions
involving numerous beneficiaries tend to create pervasive media
attention, which most commonly add pressure. The dual effects of
financial deterrence and negative public attention are effective in
achieving compliance with standards and norms of human rights and
humanitarian law. The recent trend in the US to curb the applicability
of class actions in state court actions should be noted in this regard;
it does not, however, preclude this important procedural principle
from the draft Statute.402 
Article 19
Representation of parties
1. The parties have the right to appear in person or be represented
by agents. The representation of plaintiffs by agents shall be
mandatory in cases where the plaintiffs’ safety or that of their
relatives is in danger should they appear in person. The Court decides
on appropriate measures. 
399 See ch 3 of part A for a detailed discussion. In brief, class actions are legal actions
where a small group of plaintiffs can represent the interests of possibly thousands
of other victims in court. The relevance for international tort litigation is obvious
through its financial impact and additional consequences such as media and
public attention.
400 An example of a health hazard case is asbestos litigation, which has so far seen
over 500 000 individual claims and around 40 corporate defendants filing for
insolvency because of the anticipated damages and other costs, see eg In re Joint
Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation (1995) 878 F Supp 473 (E D N Y)
78, (1996) F 3d 764. The ongoing lawsuit In re South African Apartheid Litigation
(n 130 above) is an impressive example for such human rights litigation.
401 See part A ch 2 for a discussion of the Holocaust I and II and the Apartheid class
actions.
402 See above for more information on recent legislative amendments limiting the
availability of class actions in state court cases.
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proceedings before the Court. Such assistance may only be provided
by suitable members of the law profession. The Trial Advocate gives
his or her consent on the suitability of the respective counsel after the
instigation of proceedings. The Court rules on the suitability of the
respective counsel or advocate before it commences for its first
session. Its decision is final.
3. Agents, counsel and advocates of the parties before the Court
shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary to the
independent exercise of their duties.  
4. In relation to the co-counsel of the victim-plaintiff, the Trial
Advocate has priority in respect of any motion, actions and other
procedural acts.
Commentary
The structure and wording of this article follow article 42 of the ICJ
Statute and other principles of procedure for international and
domestic criminal and administrative forums.403 Paragraph 2
reconfirms the strong position of the Trial Advocate as the ‘guardian
of the victim’ as discussed in the commentary to article 7 above. The
Trial Advocate’s discretion in choosing the suitable counsel is subject
to the Court’s supervision. Paragraph 4 clarifies the position of the
Trial Advocate as the plaintiff’s main counsel and this means that he
or she is privileged in action and standing vis-à-vis other counsels.  
Article 20
Trial procedure
1. Any proceeding before the Court is initiated by way of summons.
2. The Trial Procedure is divided into three stages:
(a) the pleading stage;
(b) the preparation for trial stage; and
(c) the trial itself.
3. The pleading stage and the preparation for trial stage shall be
conducted in writing; the trial in itself shall take place as an oral
proceeding.
403 See eg procedures before German administrative courts (Verwaltungsgerichten)
and regional criminal courts (Strafkammern der Landgerichte) as stipulated in the
respective procedural codes (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, VwGO and StPO)
which demand the representation of a private party through a counsel.
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the Court and to the parties of memorials, counter-memorials and, if
necessary, replies; also all papers and documents in support. 
5. These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in
the order and within the time fixed by the Court. 
6. A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall
be communicated to the other party. 
7. The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of
witnesses, experts, agents, counsel, and advocates. The Trial
Chamber shall read the plaintiff’s summons, ensure the presence of
parties and their counsel and enquire about the possibility of a
settlement. In cases where such a settlement is not reached, the Trial
Chamber shall then proceed with the oral proceeding.
8. The trial concludes with the closing of the hearing by the
President.
Commentary
The trial procedure follows the principles of procedure used in
common-law and civil-law jurisdictions404 and accounts for the fact
that the nature of the proceedings before the court resembles civil
procedures most closely. The court should offer the parties the
possibility of a settlement without prejudice.405 This option stresses
the notion that the procedure before the court is in principle a civil
procedure where parties have the right to find an amicable
settlement. This procedure finds its counterpart in various domestic
jurisdictions and has proved to be an important element of the
autonomy of the parties.406 
404 The three-part division of a trial is identical to the SA action procedure but finds
its counterpart in civil-law jurisdictions as well. The German procedures in civil
law, administrative and criminal law know the tripartite trial structure: the
Vorverfahren (preliminary (preparatory) proceedings) serve as the stage where
legal action is initiated through the appropriate summons or pleadings, in the
Zwischenverfahren (interlocutory proceedings) the parties prepare their case
through motions and requests in respect of the admission as evidence, et cetera
and finally the hearing takes place in the Hauptverfahren (trial) stage. 
405 This form of settlement does not acknowledge any liability and as thus is not a
form of the outdated ‘payment in court’ action in common-law procedures.
406 The German Civil Procedure Code, ZPO, stipulates in § 278(1) that the court must
at any stage of the proceedings consider the ending of the lawsuit through an
amicable settlement among the parties. This conciliatory idea has found its
manifestation through the incorporation of arbitral elements in the ZPO in 2004.
See http://dejure.org/gesetze/ZPO/278.html.
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Conduct of trial proceedings
1. The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with
the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights
of the defendant and due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses.
2. The hearings shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to
close the proceedings in accordance with its rules of procedure and
evidence.
Commentary
This article finds its corresponding regulation in article 20 of the ICTY
Statute and paragraphs (2) and (7) of article 64 of the ICC Statute. It
takes into account the nature of the alleged torts as resembling
possible international crimes as well, which demand further
protective elements. Witness and victim protection and the possibility
of conducting closed proceedings are protective features which are
typical and necessary in criminal court proceedings. Paragraph 2
provides for the public’s interest in having access to information
without limiting the court’s options regarding confidential
procedures.
Article 22
Evidence
1. The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the
parties to produce any document or to supply any explanations. A
refusal shall be formally noted. 
2. The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body,
bureau, commission, or other organisation that it selects with the task
of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion. 
3. The Court considers the prior investigative findings of the Trial
Advocate carried out under article 7, paragraphs 1 and 3 as evidence
brought on behalf of the plaintiff and grants the Trial Advocate
further authority to instigate proceedings as laid out in paragraph 2.
4. During the hearing any relevant questions are to be put to the
witnesses and experts under the conditions laid down by the Court in
the rules of procedure referred to in article 6. 
5. After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the
time specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any further
76    Part Boral or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless
the other side consents. 
Commentary
This article closely follows the wording of articles 49 to 52 of the
Statute of the ICJ. Paragraph 3 stresses the strong role of the Trial
Advocate as outlined in article 7 above.
Article 23
Default judgment
1. The Court can enter a default judgment when the defendant fails
to defend him- or herself and thus enters into default. Entry of default
can take place at any stage of the trial proceeding.
2.  The plaintiff has filed for default judgment asking the Court to
set damages and issue a money judgment.
Commentary
Default judgments are known in civil trial proceedings under both
common-law and civil-law jurisdictions.407 Article 53, paragraph 1 of
the ICJ Statute acknowledges this procedure when it calls on the
Court to rule ‘in favour’ of the party who is present. 
Default judgments follow a three-stage procedure, with the
defendant defaulting in a trial proceeding, the plaintiff filing a motion
for a default judgment and the court granting a default judgment.
Given that the proceedings before the Court are quasi-criminal in
nature and effect, US ATCA adjudication serves as an example of how
powerful such default judgments could be with the majority of
defendants defaulting at one stage or another during the trial
proceedings.408  
407 See §§ 331, 330 of the German Civil Procedure Code (ZPO); rules 26, 31 and 39 of
the SA Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959; rule 55 of the US Federal rules of civil
procedure.
408 See Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 239 et seq for an overview of case law
where the defendants defaulted. 
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Judgment
1. When, subject to the control of the Court, the agents, counsel,
and advocates have completed their presentation of the case, the
President shall declare the hearing closed. 
2. The Court shall adjourn to consider the judgment. 
3. The deliberations of the Court shall take place in private and
remain secret. 
(a) All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges
present. 
(b) In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge
who acts in his or her place shall have the casting vote. 
4. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based and
shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the
decision. 
5. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the
unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to
deliver a separate opinion. 
6. The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the
Registrar. It shall be read in open court, due notice having been given
to agents.
Commentary
The procedures on finding a judgment follow the procedure of the ICJ
Statute as stipulated in articles 54 to 58. The ICJ procedure offers a
conclusive set of rules which seems to be acceptable for international
proceedings before the Court.
Article 25
Appeal of judgments
1. A judgment of the Court under article 23 may be appealed in
accordance with the rules of this statute by either party, represented
by their counsel.
2. The appeal has to be made within one month of receipt of the
written judgment by the parties’ counsels. The application has to
state the grounds of appeal, which may be
(a) procedural error;
(b) error of fact; or 
78    Part B(c) error of law.
The application to appeal must be brought to the notice of the
Registry and the other party’s counsel.
3. For the purpose of the appeal proceedings, the appeals chamber
shall have all the powers of the trial chamber. The appeals chamber
decides on the admissibility of the application. After having found
that the application is admissible, the appeals chamber proceeds in
accordance with articles 19 and 20. 
4. If the appeals chamber finds that the proceedings that were
appealed were unfair in a way that affected the reliability of the
judgment, or that the judgment appealed was materially affected by
error of fact or law or procedural error, it may: 
(a) reverse or amend the judgment; or 
(b) order a new trial before a different trial chamber.
For these purposes, the appeals chamber may remand a factual issue
to the original trial chamber for it to determine the issue and to
report back accordingly, or may itself call evidence to determine the
issue. When the judgment has been appealed only by the defendant
it cannot be amended to his or her detriment. 
5. If in an appeal against a judgment the appeals chamber finds
that the awarded damages are disproportionate to the tortious act, it
may vary the damages in accordance with article 13, paragraph 4. 
6. The judgment of the appeals chamber shall be taken by a
majority of the judges and shall be delivered in open court. The
judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based. When there is
no unanimity, the judgment of the appeals chamber shall contain the
views of the majority and the minority, but a judge may deliver a
separate or dissenting opinion on a question of law. 
7. The appeals chamber may deliver its judgment in the absence of
the parties.
8. Decisions on the admissibility and the judgment are final. 
Commentary
Article 24 follows the structure and proceedings of articles 81 and 83
of the ICC Statute, one of the most compelling recent compilations in
international law. It has been modified to accommodate necessary
elements of civil proceedings. Paragraph 1 clarifies that only final
judgments of the Court as defined in article 23 may be appealed.
Default judgments and other decisions of the Court are therefore not
subject to appeal. The reference to other rules of the Court clarifies
  Part B    79that the extensive role of the Trial Advocate persists in appeal
proceedings. 
The relatively lengthy appellation period as set forth in paragraph
2 follows the continental example which grants a one-month period to
appeal a decision.409 The complexity of the proceedings before the
Court, which include a huge variety of legal questions and standards,
justify the granting of such a lengthy period. Unlike common-law
proceedings, the draft Statute does not impose on the parties a
further obligation to apply for leave to appeal the Court’s
judgment.410 Paragraph 2 further gives the grounds on which the
appeal may be based.
The procedure of the appeals chamber (outlined in paragraph 3)
follows the procedure of the trial Court as stipulated in articles 19 and
20. It is important to note that there is no pre-appeal stage where the
trial chamber decides whether the application for appeal shall be
refused or granted. This one-tier approach seems to be adequate
considering the importance of the appeal stage in contributing to
international justice.  
Paragraph 4 defines the powers of the appeal chamber in respect
of its judgments. A non-detriment411 clause as known from criminal
proceedings does not apply in the appeal proceedings. The finality of
the judgment under paragraph 8 means that the parties do not have
to be present when the judgment is delivered.
Article 26
Victims’ right to reparation
A victim shall be entitled to adequate, effective and prompt
reparation which shall aim to promote justice by redressing violations
of international human rights or humanitarian law. Reparations shall
be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. 
Commentary
Reparation by means of financial compensation explicitly recognises
the victim’s suffering. The right to adequate reparation restores the
victim’s honour and dignity in the private and public domain.412 This
notion follows human rights theory’s basic principle that a right has to
409 See eg § 517 ZPO for the German Berufung (appeal).
410 See eg s 20 of the SA Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.
411 Such a clause can be found in art 83 par 2 of the ICC Statute and essentially
forbids a detriment of the sentence in the appeals procedure when the appeal
was lodged by the convicted person or on his or her behalf. 
412 Part A ch 1.
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questions the existence of the correlative right itself.413 
Acknowledging this principle, the draft Statute follows the
wording of ECOSOC’s ‘Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a
remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law’414 as a more recent international
compilation on the subject of redressing human rights atrocities.
Article 27
Scope of damages
1.  Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the situation as
it had been before the violation of international human rights or
humanitarian law occurred. 
2.  Compensation should be provided for any economically
assessable damage resulting from violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law, such as:
(a) physical or mental harm, including pain, suffering and emotional
distress; 
(b) lost opportunities, including education; 
(c) material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning
potential; 
(d) harm to reputation or dignity; and 
(e) costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicines and
medical services, and psychological and social services. 
Article 28
Punitive damages
1. The Court has the discretion to award punitive damages in
addition to individual monetary reparation as set forth under articles
26 and 27.
2. The decision of the Court should state the reasons for awarding
punitive damages as additional means of punishment and deterrence. 
3. The decision of the Court should reflect the individual
circumstances of the case which give rise to the awarding of punitive
damages. In complying with this provision, the Court must determine
whether
(a) the tortious actions of the defendant
413 Boyd (n 238 above) 1182.
414 Art 5 par 15.
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(ii) demonstrated a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an
evil motive;
(b) the defendant possesses sufficient funds or assets;
(c) the defendant is a legal person who possesses sufficient funds or
assets. 
4. The Court shall award punitive damages when at least one of the
requirements as set forth under paragraph 3 is met. 
Commentary
Importantly, civil remedies punish and possibly deter because they
impair the offender financially. Awarding punitive damages is well
established in US ATCA adjudication having the explicit motive of
punishing a perpetrator and simultaneously detering a potential
perpetrator.415 The legal concept of punitive damages is specific to
the US with nearly no corresponding principles in other legal
jurisdictions.416 Civil-law jurisdictions used to reject the acknow-
ledgment of US punitive damages awards on the grounds of a possible
ordre public violation because of their inherent penal component.
The German Federal Court of Justice417 and French higher courts418
have recognised scenarios where punitive damages may be
enforceable. A recent survey found that in Austria, the Czech
Republic and Denmark, punitive damages were not enforceable, while
courts in Germany, France, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain and Sweden allowed for punitive damages when
certain requirements were met.419 Punitive damages are as a concept
also fairly unrecognised in international law.420 
415 See Filartiga decision. See part A ch 2. 
416 See Stephens & Ratner (n 137 above) 215 for a summary. Nater-Bass ‘US-style
punitive damages awards and their recognition and enforcement in Switzerland
and other civil-law countries’ (2003) 4 DAJV-Newsletter 154-160 for a civil-law
perspective. 
417 The German Federal Court of Justice found in 1993 that punitive damages awards
should be recognised on a case-by-case basis, see judgment of 4 June 1992 IX ZR
149/91 (1992) Neue Juristische Woche 3096 et seq.
418 Nater-Bass (n 416 above) 156. 
419 As above 157.
420 See eg Velasquez Rodriguez case (compensation) where the IACtHR held that
international law did not recognise the concept of punitive or exemplary
damages, (1987) 7 IACHR Series 52 and judgment par 38 in 28 International Legal
Materials (1989) 291; Laplante (n 116 above) 379-388 for a discussion on punitive
damages as a remedy in international law and its implications. 
82    Part BConsidering punitive damages’ well-proven deterrent effect, the
draft Statute follows the US ATCA example of combining personal
damage awards with punitive damages. Cognisant of the ILC’s
‘Commentaries to the draft articles on responsibility of states for
internationally wrongful acts’421 which rules out the applicability of
exemplary — which is punitive damages —  this draft Statute
nevertheless adopts the concept from US civil law, arguing that (a)
the nature of the torts constitutes severe breaches of international
humanitarian and human rights law; (b) future defendants will often
be individuals or legal entities with sufficient assets acquired directly
from tortious acts; and (c) it is necessary to use such exemplary
damage awards for financial punishment and deterrence. These
points support the inclusion of punitive damages as damages available
under the draft Statute. It should, however, be noted that this type
of remedy could deter states from joining this Convention.422 
Paragraph 3 sets out the conditions for awarding punitive
damages. It places a two-fold condition upon the court’s discretion.
Either the heinous nature of the tortious conduct or the personal
circumstances of the defendant calls for punitive damages. While the
first standard applies mostly to grave human rights atrocities as
international torts, the latter serves as a lever of accountability in
cases where financial wealth is deprived from tortious conduct.
Unlike cases in which the first standard is applicable, the latter is
receptive to other more ordinary international torts as stipulated in
article 11(f) above. It would most likely apply to defendants who are
legal persons.
Paragraph 4 limits the discretion of the Court in deciding on the
award of such damages in cases where the requirements of paragraph
3 are met; it therefore serves as a mandatory clause. 
Article 29
Enforcement of judgments and forfeiture measures
1. Each state party shall give effect to the execution of judgments
of the Court without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties,
and in accordance with its domestic legal principles. Each state party
undertakes to review its domestic laws for compliance with this
Statute.
2. Each state party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance
with its domestic legal principles, for the identification, detection
and freezing or seizure of any funds or assets owned by or under the
421 n 47 above, 245.
422 See Laplante (n 116 above) 381, outlining the negative consequences of choosing
punitive damages as a remedy.
  Part B    83control of the defendant and which is or was acquired through the
defendants tortious conduct.
3. Each state party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance
with its domestic legal principles, for the forfeiture of funds or assets
as ordered by the Court.  
4. The Court reviews state parties’ compliance in respect of
paragraphs 1 to 3 on an annual basis and reports non-complying states
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. The Court enters into the necessary agreements with non-state
parties and international organisations to ensure wide compliance
with the Court’s judgments.
Commentary
Enforcing the Court’s judgments is key to its success. The provisions
of this article borrow from article 8 of the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999,423 as the
most conclusive and modern example of a provision on the subject of
tracing and attaching financial assets globally. Given that defendants
would include individuals and corporations with significant assets
which could directly have resulted from tortious acts, makes
detection, freezing and forfeiture of resources extremely important
for civil remedies to be effective.
The Court’s powers of review and reporting in terms of paragraph
4 follow the procedures on compliance of the major human rights
treaty system of the UN.424 This procedure should be able to
safeguard the Court’s efficiency.
Paragraph 5 empowers the Court to extend its jurisdiction for
enforcing its judgments beyond the limitations of the draft Statute.
The possibility of including enforcement mechanisms for the
execution of the Court’s judgments in international organisations’
agreements will empower the court’s impact on the international
community. For example, enforcement clauses could be included in
multilateral agreements of powerful economic organisations such as
the International Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European Union
423 As adopted by the General Assembly 9 December 1999. UN Doc A/C 6/54/L 2
Annex I. See Bachmann (n 32 above).
424 See above part A.
84    Part B(EU), thus following already existent human rights clauses in trade
agreements.425 
Article 30
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the 60th day following
the date of the deposit of the 15th instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
2. For each state ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the
Convention after the deposit of the 15th instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into
force on the 60th day after deposit by such state of its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
425 Signatory states will enforce it themselves and other international agreements
under the supervision and jurisdiction, authority, respectively, of international
trade organisations and institutions such as NAFTA, the WTO and EU which
incorporate a so-called human rights enforcement clause in their treaties. The
UN’s response to the threat of financed terror in the wake of 11 September 2001
and the ‘War on Terror’ will be used for tracing and freezing assets of alleged and
convicted human rights violators.
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